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ABSTRACT
This thesis was an investigation into the historical
significance and interpretation the Alaskan boundary dispute
played in the tripartite relations of Canada, the United States,
and Great Britain.
The first purpose of this work was to fully examine HayHerbert Treaty, emphasizing the hitherto unacknowledged benefits
inherent in the treaty.

The second purpose of this work was to

reexamine Theodore Roosevelt's actions that have previously been
the focal point of research in the Alaskan boundary dispute.

The

final purpose of this work was to explain the greater historical
importance Canadians have maintained in the Alaskan boundary
dispute and the affect of that greater relative significance.

In

more specific terms, the research showed the considerable study
and emphasis the Alaskan boundary dispute received in Canadian
historiography in opposition to the lack of research on this
topic in the United States historiography.
The methodology of this thesis consisted of analyzing
primary documents from diplomatic figures.

Emphasis was given to

the letters between Secretary of State John Hay, President
Roosevelt,

Henry Cabot Lodge,

Shifton, Lord A1verstone,

Prime Minister Laurier,

and Henry White.
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Clifford

However, newspaper

reports from toe United States, Canada, and Great Britain were
also explored.

Secondary works used included biographies of key

figures and histories dealing with foreign relations between the
countries.

These latter sources were also engaged as primary

sources when investigating the historiography.

UNDERSTANDING THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE

The Alaskan Boundary dispute involved contradictory
interpretations of the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825; a treaty
which determined the boundary between the Alaskan Panhandle and
Canada.

The dispute was at its height during the period from

1896 to 1903.

In order to understand the Alaskan boundary

dispute and its historiographical legacy, an understanding of the
attitudes the Canadian people had of the United States during the
dispute must first be discussed.

Indeed,

it will be argued that

the legacy of the Alaskan boundary dispute can be viewed as a
direct result of attitudes of the Canadian people before,

during,

and after the award.
The old maxim that history is written by the victors simply
does not hold true in this case.

The history of the Alaskan

boundary dispute has been written almost exclusively by the
losers in this case, Canadians.

History is written by those

individuals that find meaning and wish to place importance in the
events of the past.

Importance is the chief concern and Canadian

+historians ascribed more importance to the Alaskan boundary
dispute than their American counterparts.
A select group of Canadian historians found consequential
meaning in the Alaskan boundary dispute.
1

This group was the so-

2
called "independent nationalist" group of Canadian historians.
The importance of the Alaskan boundary dispute was its connection
to Canadian nationalism.

The development of Canadian autonomy

was an evolutionary process opposed to the revolutionary process
of American independence.

Canada became gradually more

autonomous from Great Britain over a long period of time.

This

slow development created innumerable opportunities for arguments
to develop between Canada and Great Britain.

Historians played a

critical role in these arguments by interpreting events into pro
autonomy and anti-autonomy categories.
Historians such as John Ewart and 0. D. Skelton, who
favored a more autonomous Canada, became the principal historians
of the Alaskan boundary dispute.

Because these writers were

promoting the development of a more autonomous Canadian
government,

the Alaskan boundary dispute was portrayed as an

example of British Imperial neglect,
this type of work,
Canadian history;

if not treachery.

Through

the dispute was given great significance in
indeed, the Alaskan boundary dispute was

interpreted as "one of the turning points of Canadian history."1
The positioning of the Alaskan boundary award as a result
of British negligence was far less a matter of critical
interpretation of facts than it was a continuation of the
immediate reaction the Canadian people had towards the Alaskan
boundary award.

This immediate reaction was a product of their

preconceived attitudes towards the United States and the actions

3

of the Alaska Boundary Tribunal's two Canadian commissioners
(which will be covered in detail in course of this w o r k ) .
The preconceived notions of the Canadian public were a
result of the uneasiness Canadians felt toward the United States.
This uneasiness was fostered by the long and often times troubled
history of Canadian-American relations.

As former American

Secretary of State John W. Foster explained,
From the very beginning of our independence
nation, our northern boundary line has been
of almost constant discussion, and often of
controversy, and more than once has brought
countries to the brink of war.2

as a
the source
angry
the

Canada found this troublesome relationship even more
difficult, because it was the smaller and less powerful
nation.
Early twentieth century Canadians had learned through
experience to be cautious of the expansionist United States. This
apprehension was not without cause.

Americans had attacked

Canada in the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812.

American

based groups such as the Fenians had invaded Canada as late as
the 1870's.a

Prominent figures in United States government had

talked of Canada being ceded as adjustment for the Alabama
claims.b

Along with many other incidents,0 there was considerable

reason for Canada to be uneasy about the United States.

a The Fenians were an organisation that sought Independence for Ireland
from Great Britain.
b The United States, in the Alabama cla as, charged that Great Britain
was responsible for adding the Confede, ate states in the American Civil
War.

4
Not only was uneasiness towards the United States a notion
of the Canadian public,
nationalism.

it became a definition of Canadian

W. S. Wallace, the first editor of the Canadian

Historical Review, "recognized that the [Canadian] sense of
nationality rested on a geographical separateness,
of the American Revolution,
1812. ”3

Canadians,

the rejection

and the legacies of the War of

or at least Canadian historians,

defined

themselves in opposition the United States.
Canada offers a unique arrangement in the conception of a
Nation-State.

The concept of a nation traditionally centers

around considerations such as ethnic makeup,
institutional differences,

language,

race,

and geographical considerations.

In

relation to the United States and Canada, very few distinctions
are apparent.

The two nations are remarkable similar.

product of English tradition.

Each is a

The geographical separation,

with

the exception of the Great Lakes is simply a man-made boundary.
The greatest extent of the boundary is based on the abstract
concept of a line of latitude,

invisible in reality.

has a sizable and distinct minority group.

Each nation

So it seems natural

that each country would seek to partially define itself in

c Other United States-British North American boundary controversies
included St. Croix River, Passamaquoddy Bay Islands, Northeast
boundary, the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, Commission for St.
Lawrence and Great Lakes, Commission for Lake Superior and Lake of the
Woods, the Rocky Mountain to Pacific boundary, and the San Juan Island
dispute.

5
opposition to the other.

In fact, this becomes a necessary step

encourage distinct and separate nationalism.
Canada and the United States have remained separate
entities.

The struggle to remain distinct is a more prevalent

subject of discourse in Canada.

Canada has made its distinction

from the United States as an important aspect of its own sense of
nationalism.

However, because Canadian nationalism to some

extent revolves around the idea of distinction instead of more
noticeable physical differences there is a constant apprehension
concerning a unity with the United States.

Because of the sheer

size and importance of the United States, unity would mean the
disappearance of Canada.
As legitimate as Canadian uneasiness may or may not have
been,

the fact remains that Canadians were uneasy about their

great neighbor to the south.

Canadian attitudes towards the

United States "contained elements of profound distrust."4

This

distrust made many Canadian excessively critical of any American
actions relating to Canada.

This was especially true of the

Alaskan boundary dispute.
Canadian distrust of the United States was a major factor
influencing the vehemence of Canadian support for the claims put
forward by the Wilfred Laurier's Administration.

This distrust

provided the opening needed for many Canadians to take "an easy
but illogical step... to assume that the case of their country
was the stronger of the two."5

This primary belief resulted in a

6
legacy of interpretation that positioned the dispute as a lasting
reminder of British negligence towards Canadian needs.
The Alaskan boundary dispute has been extensively written
about in Canadian history because of the importance it had to
that country.

The lack of alternative interpretation has left

the dispute subject to Canadian bias.

Perhaps the most important

oversight by previous historians is the lack of interest paid to
the Hay-Herbert treaty, which provided for the final settlement
of the controversy.
In opposition to the dominant historiography,

an in-depth

study of the benefits of the Hay-Herbert treaty will lead to a
fuller understanding of the Alaskan boundary dispute.

The

British negotiation of this treaty provides evidence of its
willingness to take up the torch for Canadian interests,

while

American negotiation further acknowledges the United States'
respect for its neighbor to the North.
The Hay-Herbert treaty provided the settlement for the
Alaskan boundary dispute.

The treaty was negotiated by Secretary

John Hay and British Ambassador to the United States Michael
Herbert.

The even-numbered tribunal established by the treaty

benefited the United States, Canada,

and Great Britain.

While

the negotiation of the treaty was a diplomatic success, many
positive aspects of the treaty were Destroyed by political
actions surrounding the actual tribunal.

The negative political

actions of the United States were unfairly highlighted in the

7

Canadian contemporary press, while the actions of the Canadian
commissioners were overlooked.

In addition, previous historical

interpretations have focused too heavily on the political actions
while excluding any mention of the benefits of the treaty.

With

the passage of time, more adequate reflection can be achieved in
relation to the dispute.

Therefore this interpretation of the

Alaskan boundary dispute will be instrumental in pointing out and
correcting traditional bias in the historiography of the Alaskan
boundary dispute.

THE DISPUTE' S ORIGINS

The Alaskan boundary dispute's origins stem from a long
tradition of misunderstanding and mismanagement.
legacy through early Ukases, diplomatic actions,

The unclear
treaties,

and

conferences set the stage for understanding the importance of the
Hay-Herbert Treaty and the actions that would follow.
The northern Pacific coast is a jagged mountainous
coastline.

The largest feature of this area is the Archipelago

Alexander,

a long line of islands extending from Puget Sound at

47° 03' to Taiya Inlet at 59° 29'.1

The archipelago islands are

14,000 square miles in combined area.
described it in 1886,
tortuous line,

As Charles Hallock

"the coast maintains the same indented and

flanked by innumerable islands."2

In this maze of

islands and mountains a boundary was to be laid down.
The coast of Alaskan panhandle has two mountain ranges.
The first range is St. Elias Range which runs along the coast and
the tops of which create the islands of the archipelago.
second,

higher range,

The

is the Coast Range which is located behind

the St. Elias Range to about 63° north latitude and makes up the
watershed for the upper Yukon.J

Neither range creates a single

mountain crest splitting the panhandle.
form a sea of mountains.

8

Instead these chains

9
The North American Pacific coast was explored by numerous
Europeans during the period from 1539 to 1603, including Juan
Rodriguez Cabrillo,
Aguilar,

Sebastian Vizcaino,

Frenande? de Cordova y

Sir Frances Drake, and William Cavendish.

However,

these explorers restricted their voyages to the lower latitudes.
The Russian explorer claiming the Right of Discovery to the
panhandle was Vitus Janassen Bering

(a Dane employed by Russia)

in 1741.4
Peter the Great commissioned Bering to explore the north
Pacific just weeks before his death in 1725.5

On July 15,

1741,

the vessel St. Paul discovered the coast near latitude 55° 21'.6
Bering secured Russian possession of the North Pacific coast
above 55° latitude,

and the Russians soon defended this claim.

In the Ukase of Empress Catherine given December 22,

1786,

she

ordered ships into the North Pacific for "the protection of
rights on lands discovered by Russian seafarers."
to the naval presence,

[o]ur

In addition

the Russian claim was fortified by the

settlements on Bering and Copper Islands.8
The British had a claim to "Right of Discovery" and
occupation on the North Pacific on Vancouver Island.
British, however,
the Pacific.
westward.

The

had stronger claims to lands just inland from

The Hudson's Bay Company had expanded steadily

With increased fur trade nearing the Pacific,

British sought Pacific ports to ship furs to the Orient.

the
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One of the first Britons to explore the Alaskan coast was
Captain James Cook.
travels,

A leading explorer, and famous for his world

Cook, sailed to Alaska on his third voyage in 1788.

Near

the Alaskan coast, Cook stayed away from large areas of the coast
when the winds became strong.

The result of Cook's actions was

that "several great gaps were left unexplored."9

Particularly

notable is the large gap in the area between 50° and 55°.10
was not impressed with the value of the northern territory,

Cook
as he

deemed most of the furs from this area as inferior in quality,
with the notable exception of the sea otter.11

However,

the

prospect of discovering a Northwest Passage was still enticing as
a route to the Orient.
The Orient was an important market.

It provided much of

the incentive for exploration of the North Pacific in search of a
Northwest Passage during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
It was during this time that George Vancouver made his
investigations in the Alaskan Panhandle in 1792,
were published in 1798.12

'93,

'94, which

The nature of Vancouver's explorations

was not a Lewis and Clark type expedition to map and chart
resources and landmarks.

Instead, Vancouver was primarily

searching the north Pacific coast in an attempt to find the
western end of the Northwest Passage.

His charts contained only

vague estimated descriptions of inland features.3

See Vancouver's chart on next page.

However,
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Illustration 1: Vancouver's Map
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Vancouver's charts and narrative would play a critical role in
the Alaskan boundary dispute.
The first major diplomatic action concerning the Alaska
coast was the Ukase of 1799.

Tsar Paul I issued the Ukase of

1799 which claimed the southern boundary of Alaska down to 55°
north latitude.3,3

Foreign countries generally accepted the Ukase.

It provided the Russian-American Company with exclusive rights to
the area.

The Ukase was effective for twenty years,

then in 1821

another Ukase was issued.
The Ukase of 1821 produced the first major controversy.
Tsar Alexander I took the occasion to extend the southern
boundary to the 51° north Latitude and to close the north Pacific
Ocean to foreign shipping.14

This was an important action for

whereas the Ukase of 1799 "had called forth no protest;

it was

only when the 1821 Ukase carried the latitude to 51° that the fur
traders of the United States and Great Britain were aroused."15
By this time, both the United States and Great Britain had claims
to the Oregon territory that extended to 54° north latitude.
More important than the territory were the navigation rights.
The Russians claimed a 100-mile nautical boundary which virtually
closed the Bering Sea to foreign nations.
Stern opposition from both the Americans and British met
Tsar Alexander's Ukase.

However, neither country wanted to

humiliate the Russian government so no outright rejection of the
Ukase was issued.

As for the Ukase of 1821,

it "was a political
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blunder.

It almost solicited attack."16

However,

resolving the

situation with a treaty everyone could agree on would take four
years.

The Americans were the first to resolve the situation

with Russia.
The Russian-American Convention of 1824 resolved the matter
between the Americans and Russians.
to solve.

The Americans had a weaker claim to the northern parts

of the Oregon territory.

Therefore they were more generous in

conceding territory to the Russians.
Russians,

This dispute was the easier

For their part the

eager to establish a precedent boundary with the

Americans for their later negotiations with the British, were
willing to drop their marginal claim to lands south of 54° 45'
north latitude.
The main objective of the Convention of 1825 between Great
Britain and Russia was to disavow the Ukase of 1821.

Great

Britain was primarily concerned with navigation rights in the
North Pacific, while the boundary line was a secondary
consideration.17

However, unlike the Americans who required only

a north-south boundary, Great Britain and Russia also had to
negotiate an east-west boundary.

The east-west parallel in the

northern area was gradually pushed back by the British to the
141° of longitude.

However in drawing the panhandle boundary,

"two considerations made a parallel of latitude an awkward
boundary line.

One was the west to Southeast trend of the coast

south of Yakutat Bay; the other was the uncertainty as to how far
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east such cession should reach."18

Therefore a natural boundary

was considered highly desirable.
The negotiation for the panhandle boundary ran into many
problems.

None of the negotiators had any first hand knowledge

of the area,
either.

and beyond, that it appeared that no one else did

"There were... no original and trustworthy charts of the

Northwest Coast except those of Vancouver, which had been
published twenty-six years before the Convention."19

While

Vancouver had explored and charted many if not all of the inlets
and bodies of water, at the time of the negotiation of the 1825,
"no one of record had ever penetrated fifty miles inland."70

The

maps that the negotiators did have were "imperfect and
antiquated."21

The result was a natural boundary that would be

based on the scanty evidence of the geographic features of the
panhandle then available.
The Russian claim to exclusive navigation of a hundred-mile
territorial limit was against common international law.
established limit was a three-mile zone.

The

The Russians had little

hope of obtaining all they claimed in the Anglo-Russian
negotiations of 1825, because of the drastically more substantial
British settlements and claims in the inland position of the
North Pacific and international law being on the British side.
Therefore a concerted effort was made to establish as much
territory on the southern boundary of the Alaskan Panhandle as
possible.

The Russians made "the retention of the 55° of
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Latitude as an approximate southern boundary... a face-saving
issue."22

The British eventually agreed and after considerable

negotiation a treaty was signed.
The Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825 established the boundary
of Alaska.

This treaty established a line starting at the

southernmost tip of Prince of Wales Island that was to continue
north along the Portland Channel until the line intersected with
the fifty-sixth degree of latitude.

From there, the line was to

"follow the summit of the mountains situated parallel to the
coast" until it reached the one hundred forty-first degree of
longitude.‘3

An important stipulation was that the mountain

summit line was to extend no farther than ten leagues from the
coast.24

However,

the Alaskan Panhandle is filled with

indentations and protrusions,b
of channels,

inlets, sounds,

The coast is a jagged line full

and promontories.

The mountain

summit line referred to by the Treaty of 1825 proved elusive on
such a c o a s t .
The actual map line adopted by the Russians was a stretch of
land protruding ten leagues in from the coast without regard to
any mountain chain.

The Russian Admiralty map of 1827 also

displayed the boundary as encircling large inlets such as the
Lynn Canal.

The Russian claims were undisputed,

United States purchased the territory in 1867.

even after the
The boundary only

came into question when Canadians objected to the American

b

See Map 1 on next page.
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continuation of the Russian interpretation during the late
nineteenth century.
American involvement in the Alaskan Panhandle reemerged in
1867, when the United States purchased Alaska from the Russians.
The treaty ceding Alaska to the United States was signed March
30, 1867,

ratified copies were exchanged on June 30,

formal transfer took place on October 18 , 1867.25

1867, and

The United

States now increased its border with British North America.
immediate transfer was uncomplicated,

The

even though the precise

boundary had not been demarcated.
The precise boundary received little attention.

The

Alaskan Panhandle and surrounding areas were of little
importance.

The territory's natural resources were untapped.

The area had few settlers and no immediate need for a precise
boundary was apparent.

However,

interest in Alaska, especially

its natural resources would soon heighten.
Alaska's natural resources first became apparent in 1861.
In that year, gold was discovered on the Stakheen River.26
discovery resulted in a population influx.

The

Stakheen River mining

began and with it interest in a precise boundary between the
American and Canadian territory.
Gold discoveries in the late nineteenth-century provoked
Canadian interest in the boundary.

Most notably the Yukon Gold

Rush of the 1890's illustrated the usefulness of a seaport in
order to ship supplies and also military troops to the Yukon gold

18
fields.

The Canadians claimed the correct summit line

encompassed the mountains arising almost immediately from the
coast.

The Canadians also disputed the boundary encircling the

inlets.

This encircling of inlets cut Canada away from any deep

water ports on the Alaskan Panhandle, most notably the Lynn
Canal.

The final Canadian objection to the Russian-American line

was the position of the Portland Channel.

The Canadians

maintained the Portland Channel referred to the Pearse Canal,
instead of the ODservatory Inlet.c
the mountain summit line,

Canadian claims concerning

the Lynn Canal,

and the Portland Canals

became the central issues of the Alaskan boundary dispute.
The resulting interest provoked governmental correspondence
in relation to the boundary.

Clearly, the boundary was to be

situated along the mountain summit line.

However,

became more familiar with the terrain of the area,
of delineating this line became apparent.

as people
the difficulty

The Lieutenant

Governor of British Columbia, Joseph W. Trutch, wrote to Canada's
Secretary of State Joseph Howe on July 11, 1872.
referred to the 1825 treaty boundary line.

The letter

Trutch maintained,

"[t]ne description therein given of this line of demarcation is
not so clearly defined as to render it readily traceable on the
ground."

He suggested a clear line should be substituted.2'

The

suggestion was not followed up on and the border remained
unmarked.

This response was typical of many efforts to resolve

c See Map 2 on next page.

—
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the boundary early.

There was still relatively little interest

in the area.
In 1877, the Peter Martin case displayed the problems that
could result from an undelineated boundary.

Peter Martin was a

miner working in Canadian territory north of the Stikine River.
Martin was arrested in Canada and had to be transported through
the United States.
escape.

During the transportation, Martin tried to

The attempted escape resulted in an additional charge of

assaulting an officer.

Martin was tried and convicted.

However,

Martin petitioned for release because the second assault had
taken place on United States soil.
Martin being freed.

An investigation resulted in

After reviewing the circumstances,

the

decision was that the second event had in fact happened in United
States territory thirteen miles north of the mouth of StiKine
River.

The result for the Alaskan boundary dispute was that a

temporary boundary line was agreed to in the Stikine River.

The

line was twenty-one miles inland from the mouth of the river.28
Donald Camerond conceived the Coast Doctrine.
claimed that rather than following the shoreline
the inlets and bays)
of the coast.

Cameron

(which included

the treaty should follow the general trend

The line should disregard the deep inlets and form

a more or less straight line without jutting inland.

Cameron

submitted a report containing this argument the Canadian

a Colonel Donald Cameron was appointed to research the boundary for the
Canadians.
He was also the son-in-law of Sir Charles Tupper, the
leader of the opposition in Canada during much of the boundary dispute.

21

Secretary of State on February 18, 1875.29

Cameron's line

received the approval of the Eritish Columbian government.
However,

it would be some time before it caught on in Ottawa.

Official Canadian claims were not made until the Joint High
Commission in 1898.
Ottawa,

Even when it did attract attention in

it was not necessarily the ’’practical policy of the

Canadian government" so much as "the credo of a small but
influential coterie in the department of the Interior."30

The

problem with Coast Doctrine was it "had no warrant in intention
of the treaty makers nor support from precedent."31
The temporary boundary on the Stikine River was the first
strike against the Russian-American ten-league boundary.

The

surveyed boundary was twenty-one miles inland not the thirty to
thirty-five miles that ten leagues would require.

The moving of

Stikine River from thirty miles to twenty-one miles encouraged
Judge J. H. Gray, a member of the Supreme Court of British
Columbia.

He began to argue for larger Canadian claims.

During

the summer of 1884, he argued the line should not extend up the
Portland Canal but instead up Clarence Strait to Behm Canal.
Gray's line then followed a thin line along mountain summits
close to the boundary.32

The area and nature of the dispute was

beginning to change from a need to demarcate an agreed upon line
to the proper interpretation of the Treaty of 1825.
The Portland Channel held few of the features the 1825
claimed it to have.

The Portland Channel was a long inlet north

22
of the Pearse Channel and southern extreme of Observatory Inlet.
The Portland Channel could be viewed as flowing down either of
these waterways until it reached the Pacific.

The treaty was

unclear as to which waterway it was to follow.

In addition,

Portland Inlet was almost due east of the southern tip of Wales
Island.

Therefore it would be very difficult for it to follow in

a northerly direction from that southern tip,

that the treaty

acknowledged as the correct direction for the boundary to follow.
Finally,

the channel was to strike the 56° ia-’tude to form the

easterly boundary.

However, the Portland Channel missed the mark

falling roughly ten miles short of the 56° north latitude.
The southern boundary became an important secondary note to
the mountain summit l :oe, as the Canadian

cook advantage of

the discrepancies between the treaty and the actual channel.

In

1894, Alexander Begg* wrote "the interpolation of the three
words,

'called Portland Channel,' has rendered the wording of the

treaty obscure and the boundary impracticable."33 He continued on
to state, "Doubtless the treaty 'Called Portland Channel'

should

have been written "called Behm's Channel," and should be so
interpreted."34 Early Canadian interpreters of the treaty claimed
that name had not been in the original treaty but added later,
unfortunately for their case, they were incorrect.
Columbian theory,

The British

as it was called, was extremely weak, due in

' Alexander Begg was a newspaperman and historian.
Daily Mail correspondent in Western Canada.

He was a Toronto
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large part to the fact that Portland Channel was specifically
named in the treaty.
The process of cleverly interpreting the wording of the 1825
treaty continued in Canada.

R. E. Gosnell in Yearbook of British

Columbia for 1897 put forth the claim that "ocean" referred to
the high sea on the outside of the archipelago,

so the ten league

measurement should be measured from the outside of the
archipelago islands.35

This claim would even more drastically

reduce the American possession.

However, the archipelago claim

never attracted the influential supporters the "Coast Doctrine"
attracted.
The United States was also beginning to see the shortcomings
of the 1825 treaty.

Ti the 1880's tb

united States pur

srd

the idea that the Treaty of 1825 was "fatally indefinite and that
an application of its terms was

[a] geographical impossibility in

the light of existing knowledge of the physical features of the
region in which the boundary line must be laid down."36
mountain chain had always been in question.

The

However, with Judge

Gray's and Donald Cameron's reinterpretation of the Portland
channel the question soon broadened.
The Canadian claims were hard for Americans to understand.
In the words of George Davidson, "[f]or sixty years the terms of
the resultant Convention of 1825 had been accepted as explicit
and satisfactory,

but since 1885, contentions have been made in

order to nullify its provisions."37

In actuality,

the Canadians
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wanted to reinterpret the provisions not nullify them.

Yet,

it

was curious to American why the Canadians had not pushed their
claims before 1885 and not protested American claims officially
until 1898.
The main reason for Canadian and British neglect was
because the area lacked importance.

The area in dispute was not

especially valuable during the 1880's.

As for the size:

The area in dispute was insignificant in terms of
relation of its size and resources to those of Canada
and the United States, but the forces of national
feeling magnified its importance until it produced a
crisis in the relations of the British Empire and the
United States.38
As for the Canadians pushing new claims, as the American Review
of Reviews put it, why not, as "[t]he whole subject is

,ie in

which the Canadians had nothing to lose and everything to gain."'9
A major factor in the increased interest in the area was
the Yukon gold discoveries.

Gold had been discovered in Alaska

as early as 1849 by the Russians at Kenai Peninsula.

Additional

discoveries occurred near Wrangell in 1861, at Sumdum bay in
1870, near Sitka in 1871, near Juneau in 1873, on the Fortymile
River in 1886, and in 1893 at Hope, Rampart,

and Circle.

However,

it was the 1897 discovery of gold by George Washington

Carmack,

Tagish Charlie,

and Skookum Jim on Bonanza Creek that

set of the Great Klondike Gold Rush.
While the gold made some prospectors rich,
even more merchants wealthy.
quickly.

the rush made

News of the gold fields spread

As word got out, the excitement spread and prospectors
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appeared in Skagway and Dyea.
received increased attention,

The Alaskan boundary dispute
not because of the gold, but

because of the increased trade.
goods,

Prospectors were buying American

and entering Canada though American ports.

custom duties and American trade.

Early in 1898,

Yukon trade was in American hands.40

This meant
90% of all

Canadians saw much of

subsidiary value of their gold fields slipping into American
hands.
The Canadian government in general, and Minister of the
Interior Clifford Sifton in particular, put a priority on
regaining the wealth created by the Yukon gold
needed was an all-Canadian route to the Yukon.

Ids.

What was

The problem was

that the most acceptable route to the area was through the
Chinook and White Passes at the head of the Lynn Canal.

The

United States was in possession of this strip of the panhandle.
Skagway had been founded as late as 1897, but even then the
Canadians had not thought of protesting its settlement.

However

at the top of the Lynn Canal another body of water split off,
this was Pyramid Harbor.
In the Alaskan boundary dispute,

the acquisition of Pyramid

Harbor became the chief goal of the Canadian government.

It was

noted that, "since 1885, all attacks to break through this
lisiere of the Convention of 1825 have been mainly,
solely,

in fact

to obtain a port of ingress into British Columbia from

the Archipelago."41

The need for a port was understood first in
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British Columbia,
most part,

however this did not become apparent,

for the

to the Canadian government until the discovery of gold

in the Yukon.
The fact of the matter was that Canadians could not hope to
settle Pyramid harbor until the dispute was settled,
United States would permit such settlement.
salvage what they could of the Yukon trade,
other all Canadian routes.
co ;;truction of a railroad.

for the

In an effort to
the Canadians sought

The most popular plan called for the
In April 1898, a railroad from

Observatory Inlet to Teslin Lake was planned but was dropped on
May 25,

18 98, by the Liberal government.'12

On February 8, 18 98,

the Liberals introduced the Canadian Yukon bill.
for a railroad from Stikine River to the Yukon.
in the Conservative dominated Senate.

The plan called
The plan failed

Another attempt at an all

Canadian railroad route from Edmonton also failed in the Senate.
The Conservatives did not want the Liberals to profit from the
control of railroad contracts.43

The result was that

transportation alternatives which might have defused the Alaskan
dispute,

were destroyed in Canada by partisan politics.

The pressure and lure of the wealth of the gold trade
continued to be a strain on the settlement of the Alaskan
boundary dispute.

And for good reason: as of January 1, 1903,

the reported gold production of the Klondike district since 1897
was over $79, 000,000.44

Furthermore,

the drama was heightened by

the "the belief that all the territory in dispute was gold
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bearing."45

_h parties were faced with the realization that

:>ld discovered in a disputed area could lead to more hostility
and burden the negotiations further.
The possibility of hostility did not lead immediate action.
After the provisional settlement of the Stikine boundary and
through Cameron's new interpretations of the treaty of 1825,
negotiation for an interpretation of the treaty received less
attention.

The Joint High Commission of 1888, between the United

States and Canada met to deal with issues relating to both
nations.

The Alaska boundary dispute was only informally

discussed and no official action was taken on it.45

In the

discussions of the commission, each country assigned a leading
expert to meet.

The United States assigned William Dall,f while

Canada appointed Dr. George Dawson.9

They discussed the matter;

however nothing was agreed to during the talks so the commission
did not take up the matter.
The first major talks about interpretation of the treaty
were heard on the 10ch of February 1892.

On that date, United

States Secretary of State James G. Blaine and John W. Foster" had
a conference with Canadian representives Sir Julian Pauncefote,1
John S. Thompson

(Minister of Justice), George E. Foster *
1

f William Dali was employed by the United States Coast and Geodetic
Survey.
1 Dr. George Dawson was employed by the Canadian Geological Survey.
!l John W. Foster was the United States agent in the Bering Sea
Arbitration and an expert on the Alaskan boundary dispute. He was a
former lawyer, diplomat, and Secretary of State.
1 Julian Pauncefote was the British Ambassador to the United States.
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(Minister of Finance), and Mackenzie Bowell
Customs).

(Minister of

Two days later on the 12ch of February,

the Canadian

submitted a proposal for impartial authority to decide the
boundary.

The outside body was to rule on the mountain line and

Portland channel.

The United States objected to this proposal,

insisting that the boundary need only be surveyed, not
interpreted.

Instead a joint survey was agreed upon.4'

survey results were completed in 1895.48

The joint

These surveys were taken

from the heads of the inlets, which did little to solve the
dispute.
The Americans were still operating under the assumption
that the matter could be worked out without an interpretation of
the wording of the treaty but instead where the mountain line
existed.

It would appear that the British were following the

same train of thought.

On February 18, 1898, the Colonial Office

suggested arbitration to define the border around the heads of
inlets not to interpret whether they should cut through the
inlets or not.49

However, the matter was not subjected to

independent negotiations but was included in the issues put
before the Joint High Commission of 1898-99.
The Joint High Commission would discover just how different
and important were the conflicting claims of the United States
and Canada.

The Alaskan boundary dispute had developed over

misunderstanding and neglect.

The dispute's origins began with

the 1825 treaty meant to define the boundary, and continued
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(though mainly unappreciated)

through to the discovery of gold

which placed increased importance on settlement of the dispute.

WORKING TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT

Many outside forces affected the settlement of the Alaskan
boundary dispute.

The first step towards solving the dispute was

the commencement of official negotiations.

These negotiations

occurred during the life of the Joint High Commission.

The

Alaskan boundary was lumped in with other American-Canadian
issues.

Following the Commission,

Panama Canal,

other issues such as the

the Boer War, and domestic politics would also

interfere with an Alaskan settlement.
The first official negotiation between the United States
and Canada of the Alaskan boundary dispute was held at the Joint
High Commission of 1898-99.

The Commission was an attempt to

solve numerous conflicts between the United States and Canada,
including the North Atlantic fisheries,
armaments on the Great Lakes,
boundary.

Bering Sea sealing,

reciprocity and the Alaskan

The Commission consisted of six members from the

United States; Senator Charles Fairbanks,

Senator George Gray

(later replaced by Senator Charles Faulkner), Representive Nelson
Dingley, John W. Foster, John A. Kasson3, and T. Jefferson

3 John A. Kasson was a reciprocity expert.
diplomat and Congressman.
30

He was also a former
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Coolidgeb.

The British,

seeking to appease their North American

subjects appointed only Lord Herschell.0

Lord Herschell was

joined by one representative of the still independent colony of
Newfoundland

(Sir James Winter0) and four Canadians

Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier,

Sir Louis H. Davies®,

(Prime
Sir Richard

Cartwright1, and John Carlton*
9).1
*
During the Joint High Commission,

Canada submitted two maps

in reference to the Alaskan boundary dispute.
boundary line ran through Clarence Strait.
line ran through Pearse Canal.2

In one, the

In the other,

the

This was the first sign that the

Canadian government had officially accepted the "British
Columbian theory."

The acceptance of this theory provided

evidence that Canada was going to stretch its claims as far as
possible.

The result was that the Alaskan boundary became the

stumbling block that divided the Joint High Commission.
The Americans were frustrated by Canadian claims concerning
Alaska.

The Americans did not understand the importance Canada

placed on the issue.

The Americans believed Canada was simply

trying use the Alaskan issue as leverage for other negotiations.
Secretary of State John Hay explained, "We are absolutely driven
to the conclusion that Lord Herschell put forward a claim that he

9 T. Jefferson Coolidge was a former minister to France and financier.
0 Lord Herschell was the Lord High Chancellor of England.
d Sir James Winter was the Attorney General of Newfoundland.
9 Sir Louis Davies was the Minister of Marine and Fisheries.
f Sir Richard J. Cartwright was a member of Parliament and Minister o f
Trade and Commerce.
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had no belief or confidence in, for the mere purpose of trading
it off for something substantial."3

However,

the Canadians were

profoundly interested in Alaska and a substantial concern for
Canada was a harbor on the Alaskan coast.
The Joint High Commission's Alaskan boundary subcommittee
included Prime Minister Laurier, Lord Herschell, Senator
Fairbanks,

and John W. Foster.4

Lord Herschell became an

important advocate of all the Canadian claims.

He forcefully

argued even for claims lie had little belief in, such as the
"British Columbian theory."

Secretary Hay wrote to Henry White71

about Lord Herchell's view that "virtually the whole coast
belongs to England."J

Hay thought the coast was "a mere matter

of common sense" and "impossible that any nation should ever have
conceded" or accepted "such a ridiculous and preposterous
boundary line" as the Canadians claimed.6
appeared to be room to negotiate.

However,

there

Lord Herschell claimed "[t]he

only part of the boundary where it is of any grave importance
whether your contention or ours be well founded is in the
neighborhood of Lynn Canal."7
all the Canadian claims,

Lord Herschell, while arguing for

realized that the most pressing need for

Canada was a port to supply goods to the Yukon.
The United States was poised to compromise.
proposals,

After numerous

the United States offered to grant "occupation,

use 9

9 John Charlton was. a member of Parliament and Free Trade Commissioner
to the United States.
r‘ Henry White was the United States First Secretary in London.
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and control" of Pyramid Harbor.8

In this offer, which would be

the final compromise offered by the United States, Canada would
get the harbor they desperately wanted out not official title to
the land.

The one aspect restricting outright Canadian

sovereignty was that if Canada left Pyramid Harbor unoccupied it
would revert back to United States control.9

The Canadian

negotiators seemed inclined to accept this proposal.

However,

word of the compromise leaked out and an opposition appeared.
Notable in this regard is the letter from American ship builders
in Washington, Oregon,

and California which pressured President

William McKinley to withdraw the offer, which he did.10

American

shipping interests were strongly against the establishment of any
Canadian port, which was the chief goal of the Canadians.
result was a deadlock on the Alaskan boundary.

The

According to

Laurier "our American fellow commissioners were at first and
almost to the last disposed to come to a reasonable compromise."lj
However, no compromise would be made during the life of the Joint
High Commission.
The United States,

frustrated by Canadian claims,

encouraged, a separate plan for the boundary arbitration from the
other issues.

The main problem with separate arbitration was the

disposition of the arbitration court.

The British sought a

European judge and the Americans a Latin American judge.

When

the question of the judge's nationality resulted in a stalemate,
the United States proposed submitting the Alaskan boundary to a
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separate body composed of three American members and three
members representing Great Britain and Canada.

The Canadians

opposed this type of tribunal and insisted on an odd numbered
body,

including an outside arbitrator.12
The deadlock on the Alaskan boundary question resulted in

abandonment of the Joint High Commission.

The Canadians insisted

that if the Alaskan question could not be solved there was no
point in coming to agreements on the other issues.

The Joint

High Commission had already adjourned in Quebec on October 10
then reconvened in Washington on November 9, 1898.12

The United

States argued for another adjournment until the Alaskan matter
could be solved diplomatically,

instead of the complete break-up

of the commission as the Canadians proposed.
solved on February 20,

The matter was

1899, when the Joint High Commission

adjourned with the understanding the Commission should reassemble
at Quebec on the 2nd of August.

However,

since no agreement had

occurred on the Alaskan boundary dispute during the break,
Commission did not reassemble.14

the

In the end the Joint High

Commission "separated without being able to settle anything
whatever because neither party could yield upon the Alaskan
boundary question."15
Despite its failure,
important stepping stone.
the dispute.

the Joint High Commission was an
It provided a clearer definition of

The Americans were finally confronted with an

official Canadian interpretation of the boundary.

The dispute
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had grown from a mere demarcation of a boundary,
interpretation.

to a question of

Hope of settlement failed after the Joint High

Commission.

A major "reason for this

[the non-continuation of

negotiation]

was that the Canadians abandoned any active part in

negotiations and preferred to act merely as critics of the more
active role played by the British and American governments.”16
However, the British held an important bargaining chip.
The British were offering a new Panama canal treaty in
exchange for a favorable Alaskan boundary.

In the words of

Secretary Hay, "I obtained assurance from British Minister of
Foreign Affairs,

that if High Commission should reach an

agreement, British consent to your proposed Clayton-Bulwar Treaty
would be given at once."17

The United States had been interested

in building a Central American canal, but had found itself
restricted by the Clayton-Bulwar treaty.

In that treaty of 1850

the United States and Great Britain had agreed "neither the one
nor the other will ever obtain or maintain for itself any
exclusive control over" a Central American canal.18
The Spanish-American War had displayed the difficulties of
moving the American navy from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

The

conclusion of the war had also supplied the United States,
through the capture of the Philippines, a stepping-stone to the
China trade.1

The expanded role of Pacific trade for American

The importance of the China trade was a great consideration. It must
be remembered that Secretary Hay issued his first Open Door Note on
September 6, 1899.
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exports would also greatly benefit from a Central American Canal.
President McKinley realized the importance of negotiating a new
treaty.

However, Congress was filled with strong supporters of

building a canal with or without a new treaty.

The Senators'

only stipulation was that it be strictly American.

President

McKinley was much more in touch with the importance of honoring
treaties.

His administration was extremely interested in

renegotiating the Clayton-Eulwar Treaty.
The British were not opposed to releasing the United States
from its obligation.

However, they also saw the opportunity for

"a quid pro quo for American concessions with regard to the
Alaskan boundary."19

The Canadians were the major proponents of

this plan.

in the end the British agreed with the

However,

United States to deal with the issues separately.
The British realized Canada's desire to use the ClaytonBulwar treaty as leverage in the Alaskan boundary.

Therefore,

before Great Britain signed the Hay-Pauncefote treaty abrogating
the Clayton-Bulwar Treaty, they pressured Laurier to give
Canadian consent.

Laurier,

realizing the futility of the issue,

consented to the Hay-Pauencefote treaty under British pressure
and saw an important negotiating tool disappear.20
The first Hay-Pauncefote treaty was signed February 4,
1900.

The treaty ran into stiff resistance in the Senate.

In

the end the Senate passed the Hay-Pauncefote treaty on December
20,

1900.

However,

the Senate had added three amendments to the
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treaty.

On February 22,

1901, Great Britain decided to retain

the old Clayton-Bulwar Treaty rather than accept the amended
version.

This was a strong blow to Anglo-American relations.

The process started all over again, but would prove more
fruitful.
Henry White visited Lord Salisbury to start efforts for a
new canal treaty.

Once more Salisbury suggested compensation in

Alaska for a new canal treaty.

However, as their conversation

continued both realized the benefit of having each issue
negotiated separately.

The second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was

signed November 18, 1901 and ratified by the Senate on December
16, 1901.
Also influencing the settlement of the Alaskan dispute were
other factors occurring concurrently.

Immediately after the

adjournment of the Joint High Commission, tensions were high.
The disputed land was filled with lawless prospectors who
amplified the possibility of trouble.

To prevent trouble in May

1898, the Canadian Yukon Field Force commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel T. D. B. Evans was sent to the Yukon Gold Fields.

The

force encompassed two hundred and three volunteers from the
Permanent Force.21

By September 1899 the headquarters were

transferred to Dawson City and the force reduced by half.
1900,

the remainder of the garrison was withdrawn.^2

States troops were not immediately sent in.

In

United

Hay and McKinley

agreed in May 1899 to postpone the dispatch of American soldiers
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to Pyramid Harbor because of negotiations for a treaty
settlement.23
The result of these negotiations was net a treaty but
rather a temporary boundary.

Vivendi was agreed upon.24

On October 20, 1899,

a Modus

The boundary only covered the district

just north of the Lynn Canal.

Negotiation of a full boundary

treaty was difficult because the Americans did not want to submit
the matter to arbitration.

Secretary Hay explained the American

position in the following way: "although our claim is as clear as
the sun in Heaven,

we know enough of arbitration to foresee the

fatal tendency of all arbitrators to compromise."25
In 1900, efforts were made to resolve the boundary dispute.
The same obstruction in the form of the deciding body could not
be satisfactorily solved.

Great Britain argued the boundary was

always open so Venezuela style arbitration would be the most
appropriate.

The United States argued that the actual

demarcation of the boundary was open but the interpretation of
the treaty had not been in question for seventy years and
therefore Venezuela-style arbitration3 was not appropriate.26
The United States and Great Britain had tried to agree on a
arbitration treaty during the Venezuela boundary dispute.

The

United States had called for all territorial claims to be sent to
arbitration.

Great Britain had claimed that disputes of

territory "may be, much graver as well as much more difficult to
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decide."27

The British also believed that such a clause would

result in "an enormous multiplication" of speculative cases.28
Because of these beliefs,
not signed a treaty.

the United States and Great Britain had

The result was that a treaty which could

have bound the United States to arbitrate the Alaskan dispute had
not been signed.

The United States was in a position where it

was not forced to arbitrate.
Another sticking point was that Canada wanted to include a
clause insuring that no matter what the tribunal decided Skagway
and Dyea would remain American while Pyramid Harbor would be
under Canadian jurisdiction.29

The Americans claimed that this

was inappropriate because Skagway and Dyea had been established
and settled by Americans, whereas the Canadians had not
established any settlements in Pyramid Harbor.
While negotiations for a treaty continued on, many outside
matters began to affect the United States, Great Britain and
Canada.

Perhaps the most influential matter was the Boer War.

In October 1899,

the Boer, or South African, War broke out.

war lasted two years and eight months.30

The

The war tested not only

the strength of Great Britain and the Empire but also their
European relations.

Great Britain found little European support

for its actions in South Africa.

In fact, the German Kaiser

issued a telegram congratulating the President of the Boer
Republic on success in repelling a British raiding force.

Also

: The United States had forced Great Britain into an arbitration made up
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complicating the issue was the fact that the Boers were decidedly
better opponents than first suspected.
Great Britain was in desperate need of assistance.
However,

Canada a major colony found itself split in support of

the British side.

After all the Boer War was a colonial war, and

Canada was a colonial country in which many important figures
(especially among French Canadians*
*) had aspirations of someday
breaking from Great Britain themselves.

Also,

the Irish in their

continual battle against Great Britain sided with the South
Africans,
Therefore,

and Canada was home to many Irish immigrants.
additional incentives were explored by the British to

promote more Imperial Nationalism.

Of course one of these

incentives was support in the Alaskan boundary dispute.

British

officials such as "Lord Minto, among others, had argued that
Canada's contribution in South Africa might be traded for British
backing on Canada's Alaska boundary claims."31

Canada,

however,

was not the only country exploiting the Boer War.
The United States was the only major power to sympathize
with Britain during the Boer War.32

The United States did not

officially support the British in the war.

Indeed,

some pro-Boer and considerable Irish support.
Roosevelt,

because of this,

there was

President Theodore

refused publically support the war or

of odd numbered court including a foreign judge.
* The French-Canadians saw little reason for Canadian troops to be used
to stop a rebellion against Great Britian. Many French-Canadians hoped
to one-day split from the British Empire, and certainly found few
benefits to the Canada in supporting such a war.
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carry out further negotiation of the Alaskan boundary.j3

Domestic

politics were not the only incentives waiting for the Boer War to
end.

Roosevelt was aware that some Canadian support of Great

Britain during the Boer War was an effort to gain favor ir the
Alaskan dispute.

Roosevelt decided to wait out the Boer War so

Canada could not use its support in the Boer War as a quid pro

quo in the Alaska boundary settlement.34
Another important trend was developing during the years
1896-1903.

This trend was the withdrawal of Great Britain from

North and South America.

Historian William Morton explains,

What Canadians failed to realize was that since the
Venezuela crisis of 1895-96, Great Britain was finally
and fully withdrawing from the Americas and leaving
them, with Canada, to an unconditional American
hegemony.
The crass imperialism of the Republican
partly at the end of the century was partly the cause,
partly the result of this withdrawal.35
Canadians seemed unaware that all the attempts to secure the
inlets and heads of canals had "come from [the] Dominion of
Canada,

and not from the Government of Great Britain."36

This

general trend certainly was boosted by the ascension of Roosevelt
to the Presidency.
President McKinley was shot on September 6, 1901 and died
September 14,

1901.

The result was that Canada would have to

deal with "the big stick of a man whose invincible selfconfidence suggested that he had come to an amicable
understanding with the Deity."37

That man was Theodore Roosevelt.
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President Roosevelt is remembered for his jingoist approach
to American diplomacy.

The Alaska boundary dispute has often

been interpreted as another example of his Big Stick diplomacy.
The American Review of Reviews remarked, " [a]bout nothing had Mr.
Roosevelt ever been more frank or more uncompromising than about
this Alaskan Question."

Roosevelt simply felt there was nothing

to arbitrate.
Roosevelt's Big Stick was seen early by the Canadians,
perhaps earlier than it was even wielded.

President Roosevelt

sent troops to the Alaska Panhandle in 1902.

With the placement

of troops in Alaska, Canadians observed a "hardening of the
American attitude".

"Thus the prospects of a friendly

accommodation, never good, became steadily worse."39

However,

the

movement cf troops to Alaska did not represent a military build
up in preparation for war.

"These were scarcely

'secret

preparations for war'; they were rather reasonable precautions to
prevent the international negotiation of the Alaskan boundary
question from being complicated by local disturbances."'10
Roosevelt's reputation seems to have preceded his actions.
Later,

Roosevelt would be much more forward with his actions.

However the reaction to the placement of troops reveals how
Canadian apprehension concerning the United States fueled
misinterpretations of his actions.
Theodore Roosevelt took office in 1901 with little interest
in settling the Alaskan boundary dispute.

Roosevelt had great

43
confidence in America's claim.

modus vivendi.
Britain,

He was also satisfied with the

He felt no need to arouse any problems with Great

and advised his ambassadors to "let sleeping dogs lie."41

When the issue arose again .in 1902, Roosevelt took a firm stance.
The Alaskan boundary issue was never officially closed
after the Joint High Commission broke off indefinitely.

The

boundary dispute was the issue that no one wanted to handle in
fear of rekindling the fire.

The anticipation associated with

not dealing with the situation was due to the fear of the rapid
hostility a new gold rush in the disputed area would create.
Canadians believed that when it came to the transient,
lawless, miners, prevention was the best policy.

The

and often

The Canadians

sought to reopen the discussion in an effort to prevent future
disruption.
phony claim.

Roosevelt was suspicious, he saw Canada as pushing a
He wrote to Secretary of State John Hay in 1902

saying:
They [the Canadians] now say that as they got the
false claim in, trouble may come if it is not acted
on.
I feel a good deal like telling them that if
trouble comes it will be purely because of their own
fault; and although it would not be pleasant for us it
would be death for them.42
As much as Roosevelt would have liked to take vengeful action,
simply could not take the associated risk.

Instead,

he

after

considerable encouragement from Hay, Roosevelt agreed to proceed
with negotiations.

President Roosevelt took a different approach to
solving the dispute.

He promoted the idea of a commission
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instead of arbitration.

In 1902, he told Hay he would

appoint "three commissioners" but would also tell them "in
no case to yield any of our claim."43

Roosevelt wanted the

tribunal to consist of representatives of each country.
This early example of Roosevelt's conception of the
tribunal foreshadowed his later actions when selecting his
jurists.

The final relevant development which occurred during
the Alaskan Boundary dispute was the growth of Canada.
During the 1890's a wheat boom in Canada along with the
excitement of the gold discoveries increased Canada's
growing national pride and prospects.44

The result was that

from 1901 to 1911, Canada's population grew faster than
that of the United States.45

Canadians were coming to

believe that their nation would become the next United
States in terms of World Power.

In fact, Prime Minister

Laurier explained "As the nineteen-century was the century
of the United States... so shall the twentieth century belong
to Canada."46
Wilfrid Laurier became Prime Minister in 1896, when his
Liberal Party won federal power for the first time in twenty-two
years.

When Wilfred Laurier became Prime Minister,

Clifford

Sifton from "expansionist western Canada" became Minister of the
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Interior.

45
Up until 1896,

it was noted in the American Press that,

" [ s ]o far the so-called Canadian

'aggressions'

are all on paper.

The Cameron line has been drawn but has only a imaginary
existence."48

However,

that was soon to change with the new

government.
While Laurier*s attitude towards the Alaskan boundary
dispute betrayed "a lack of inner conviction, a merely formal
commitment to a popular but unrealistic cause," this could not be
said, of Sifton.49
enthusiasm."50
inlets,
1890,

Sifton "adopted the coast doctrine with great

Where Dawson’s Map of 1887 had cut across four

Sifton's 1898 map cut across eighteen.51 And while in

the Canadian government had said the boundary would be "no

difficulty," after the Liberal election in 1896, the Canadian
view was now that the boundary difference was "very
considerable.”52
Negotiations continued through 1901-02, on a sketchy basis.
In November 190.1, Laurier agreed to an even numbered tribunal as
long as one jurist on each side would not be a citizen of the
United States or a British subject.33

The United States,

with

Roosevelt feeling firmly in the driver's seat, rejected this
offer.

Finally in October 1902,

Prime Minister Laurier returned

from London to Canada and announced he had agreed to an evennumbered tribunal.54
The Alaskan boundary dispute had clearly became entangled
with many other issues from the Joint High Commission to 1902.
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These other issues hindered the settlement.

Only as the other

issues were resolved could the negotiation of treaty focusing
strictly on the Alaskan boundary dispute be agreed on.

THE HAY-HERBERT TREATY

A settlement that established and promoted goodwill between
all the countries,

indeed required providing explicit benefits

for each country.

The Hay-Herbert treaty was carefully

negotiated to supply important benefits to the United States,
Canada,

and Great Britain.

The Hay-Herbert treaty, which

provided for the final resolution of the Alaskan boundary
dispute, was signed in 1903.
The advantages of the Hay-Herbert treaty to the United
States began by providing a settlement on the terms that it had
originally proposed in 1898.

The treaty provided for the six-

member tribunal with three Americans and three Britons or
Canadians.

Canadians also realized that the treaty favored

America''s original proposal.

The Manitoba Free Press declared,

"The proposition is virtually the same as that brought forward by
the American members of the joint high commission three years
ago."1

However, the acceptance of American terms was a

deliberate act to apply pressure on the United States to submit
to some form of negotiation.

The United States could not refuse

a treaty with the makeup they had originally proposed, however,
there were many important reasons why the United States sought an
even-numbered tribunal.
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The Americans sought an even numbered tribunal so as not to
relinquish any control.

The British-Canadian design would have

required an outside person or body.

The final verdict would have

hinged on a foreign country or individual.

Many American

citizens did not want to risk any outsiders telling them that
America had to relinquish land to Canada.

Canada realized

America's contention that "the balance of power must be held by
no one outside of the United States."2
tribunal was a response to Americans'
sovereignty.

The even-numbered
strong sense of

If a negative decision were reached,

require the consent of at least one American.

it would

The even-number

tribunal assured American accord with the decision.
American solidarity was all that was needed in order to
insure "a practical extinction of any chance of a decision
hostile to their plans."3

The Americans could stand firm and the

worst that could happen was a deadlock.

The Hay-Herbert treaty

became America's chance for victory without the possibility of a
result hostile to their desires.

The treaty may not have

guaranteed American victory but it did all but officially
eliminate the possibility of a Canadian victory.

As one Canadian

newspaper put it, "Canada will not be the Gainer."'1

The

Americans could hardly turn down what was being described "as a
'heads I win,

tails you lose' arrangement."5

interests seemed well protected,
safeguards.

While American

they would have even more
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While the organization of the tribunal resembled the
original American proposal,

the region subject to interpretation

reflected the Canadian proposal.

Unlike earlier considerations,

the ports of Dyea and Skagway were considered open for debate.
Their inclusion resulted in a considerable chance for the United
States.

Dyea and Skagway's inclusion meant the possibility that

American towns could become Canadian property.

Towns that had

not been protested during the original settlement could become
Canadian.0

Certainly many problems would occur with the

thousands of American citizens possessing American land claims in
these areas, not to mention the disgrace for the American
government.

This important obstacle was remedied when Canadian

Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier informed United States Secretary
of State John Hay that Canada would settle for compensation and
not require the return of the actual land.7

The result was a

confirmation of friendliness and a more acceptable treaty in the
eyes of America.
The inclusion of Skagway and Dyea highlighted the main
American contention against any negotiation of the Alaskan
boundary; Americans possessed the land.

Americans interpreted

the Canadian claim as a greedy assertion resulting from the
discovery of gold in the Yukon.

The Americans were troubled by

the Canadians' dramatically changing claims.

The Canadians

seemed to be substantially increasing the area they claimed

50
during the late nineteenth century.®

Yet the important fact

remained, while the Canadians were continually changing their
claim, Americans were governing the area.
Everyone knew which country was in charge in the area.
Canadians could claim as much as they wanted, but it was doubtful
they could acquire any of the land without the consent of the
United States.

The Canadians could not simply change their

claims and plant the Canadian flag on new land.

Even in the

early days, one Canadian pioneer explained when asked why he had
not planted the British flag, "If any man had planted a British
flag then his life would not have been worth much."3

The bare

facts of the matter were that the United States held, the disputed
land.

The fact the United States agreed to any negotiation of

Canadian claims acknowledged America's concern for amiability in
Canadian-American relations.
American friendliness towards Canada would only stretch so
far.

The Americans were content to appease Canada by subjecting

the matter to an interpretation committee.

The Americans would

dismiss the Canadian claims, as long as the American claims never
came into serious contention.

As for American acquiescence,

Henry Cabot Lodge summed up American sentiment:
They [the Canadians] have an idea, I think, that we
will yield anything.
They are in error.
We are
anxious to remove a cause of international controversy
but not to yield undoubted right, & so far as the
territory goes we are perfectly content to disagree,
for we have it ail in our possession.9
See Map 4 or. following page.

5

Illustration 4: Canada's Changing Claims
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The tribunal offered the perfect structure for the Americans to
dismiss Canadian claims without jeopardizing their possession of
the land.

However, not everyone was happy with a treaty whose

chief benefit was the retaining land that was already in the
United States' possession.

Many Americans felt that the matter

should not have been sent to a tribunal.
President Roosevelt in a letter,

Frederick Holls0 warned

that the Hay-Herbert Treaty was

"very likely to be exceedingly grave."10
At first glance,

however, the Hay-Herbert treaty benefits

to the United States seem to outweigh any possible benefits the
Canadians or the British could obtain in the matter. However,

it

would be naive to think that all that was at stake was territory.
The Canadians forced American culpability.

The Americans would

not simply maintain the land because of their prominence as a
nation.

The settlement was a display of Canada's growing power.

The Canadians were forcing the Americans to acknowledge a
Canadian claim, one which the Americans had previously refused to
acknowledge.

In terms of national pride,

few things could

compare with the once small colonies of British North America
coming together to force the imperial giant of the United States
to arbitrate the question of lands currently in American
p o ssession.

b Frederick Holls was an attorney specializing in international
relations. He was the United States secretary to the 1899
International Peace Conference.
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The fact that the United States had agreed to an outside
body to settle the boundary was a tremendous victory for Canada.
Canada did not determine the terms of treaty, but in the v/ords of
Laurier, "In one way it was a great victory."11

Laurier explained

that Canada had acquired "over the pretensions of the States" a
settlement that put American territory in jeopardy.12

Laurier was

correct in displaying pride in the fact that the treaty was a
recognition of America's obligation to acknowledge Canadian
claims.

The Winnipeg Free Press sounded off in agreement,

professing "The fact that the United States had agreed to submit
the subject to any tribunal was a step in advance, because it had
all along held that there was nothing to arbitrate."13
Canadians gained something substantial,
the United States.

namely a tribunal with

In question would be land, which the United

States had possessed for over thirty years.

For the first time

the United States had made their land vulnerable.
Herbert treaty,

The

as a result,

The Hay-

should be viewed as a diplomatic

victory for Canada.
The verdict of the tribunal was secondary and also likely
to be beneficial.

The most probable outcome of the tribunal

would be a deadlock,
purposes.

and a deadlock would serve two Canadian

First, the deadlock would establish the fact that

there was a questionable border.

The United States would have

set a precedent with this tribunal.

In the event of a deadlock,

the United States would find it harder to refuse arbitration in
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the future.

If fact,

in their argument before the tribunal,

Great Britain claimed that by joining the 1903 convention the
United States had "tacitly admitted that the boundary had not
been settled."14

Second, the Canadian public's demand for a

resolution would be eased.
dealt with the issue.

The Canadian government would have

A stalemate could have mollified the

average Canadians' belief in the Canadian claim, which would
relieve political pressure.

Therefore,

a deadlock in the Alaskan

boundary tribunal would have benefited the Canadians.
While a deadlock was probable,
out of the question.

an American victory was not

Canada seemed to be risking a considerable

amount for the moral victory of forcing the United States to
submit the issue to arbitration.
case.

However,

this may not be the

The Canadians did not really have that much at stake.

No

Canadian settlements would be taken from their control and even
the settlements they could conceivably gain may not have had
significant value.

The main enticement for a favorable boundary

line was the addition of a port.

Tr.<. Manitoba Free Press

described the possible port as "a port in name only, and is
absolutely worthless to this country as a basis for controlling
the trade of the Yukon."15

After all,

these new ports would still

have to compete with the established ports at Skagway and D y e a .
With reports such as these circulating in the newspapers,

the

Canadian public was certainly aware of the questionable value of
the territory.

Along with some question as to the value of the
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land,

there is also evidence of a lack of faith in the le_. .(....racy

of the Canadian claim.
The Canadian claim did not have the strength most of the
public believed it to possess.

The Canadian government was

likely just looking to save face.

The real risk to the Canadian

government was not the loss of a possible port but the perception
of Canadian weakness.

Prime Minister Laurier feared the Canadian

public would regard any resolution as Canada surrendering or
sacrificing its interests to the United States.

Laurier wanted

to dispose of the Alaskan boundary controversy without committing
the Canadian cardinal sin of selling out to America or allowing
Great Britain to sell out Canada to the United States.

The

tribunal, made up of "impartial jurists of repute" was a perfect
vehicle to let the Canadian public down gently.

When asked about

the provisions as to the selection of the jurists,

Prime Minister

Laurier's response was "the only provision is that they are to be
jurists of repute."16 The hope was jurists of the highest repute
would be chosen, allowing a pro-American decision to be viewed
with a sense of justice in Canada.

As John Hay's biographer

Tyler Dennett claims,
All of the information received during the summer (of
1902), however, confirmed the impression conveyed by
previous correspondence that Laurier was seeking an
opportunity to escape with as little loss of prestige
as possible from an awkward situation in which he had
placed himself as the champion in Canada of doubtful
rights in Alaska.17
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This seems to support the idea Laurier doubted Canada's claims.
This was certainly the stance of John Hay when he wrote President
Roosevelt saying,

"I knew, both from Pauncefotec and Laurier that

they had no belief in their case...."18

The Canadian government's

moral victory was quite substantial, due to the fact that their
leader,

and once great proponent of Canada's Alaskan boundary

rights, had relatively little faith in verification of Canadian
claims.

The fact remained "from the Canadian point of view,

the

treaty was a distinct improvement over the earlier drafts."'9

In

the end Laurier agreed to the even-numbered tribunal that later
Canadians would call a "lopsided arbitration."20
The final contributor,

Great Britain, had perhaps the least

at stake and the most to gain.
friendship.
growing.

It was in need of American

Great Britain's power was fading while America's was

The British had just completed a less than impressive

showing in the Boer War, while the Americans had recently won an
empire in the Spanish-American War.

More to the point, Great

Britain needed friends to counter Germany.

The Germans were

expanding which caused a growing threat to Great Britain.21
order to gain American friendship,

In

the British wanted to dispose

of all Anglo-American controversies.

The list of grievances

included the Venezuelan blockade,11 North Atlantic fisheries,

: Lord Julian Pauncefote was the British Ambassador to the United States
before Sir Michael Herbert.
3 The time of the Treaty was crucial, not for any Alaskan disturbances
but instead because of problems in Latin America. Great Britain had
joined Germany in a blockage of Venezuela, in an effort to force that
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Bering Sea sealing,

and the Alaskan boundary.

The Hay-Herbert

treaty was used as a symbol that the Anglo-American friendship
had not been broken by the Venezuelan problems.

One London

correspondent noted that the treaty gave "undoubted proof of the
uninterrupted friendliness existing between Great. Britain and the
United States."22

According to Ambassador Michael Herbert, "[t]he

time had come for Great Britain to choose between Germany and the
United States."23

The symbolic nature of Anglo-American

friendship within the Hay-Herbert treaty was evident from the
beginning.
The British also expected to gain Canadian esteem with the
Hay-Herbert treaty.

The British hoped to be seen as doing the

Canadians a favor by establishing a mechanism for the settlement
of Canadian claims.

Canada had been pushing Great Britain for a

settlement, but as a British colony it had no power over its own
foreign affairs.

Therefore,

Canada, particularly Prime Minister

Laurier, pressured Great Britain to resolve the matter.

After

the Hay-Herbert treaty was made public, the London Times
acknowledged that, "Canada has been pressing for a solution of
the Alaska problem for more than a year."24 The Times also
applauded Laurier's role in the settlement saying, "it
treaty]

[the

is owning to Sir Wilfrid Laurier's initiative"25 and

attributing it "to Sir Wilfrid Laurier's personal persistence."20

country to pay its debts. The blockade received strong condemnations
from the United States. The increase in hostilities resulted in
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Canadian pressure finally paid off and the British could reap
some of the benefits.

Lord Lansdowne® gave perhaps the most

telling description of the negotiations when he explained,
he

[Lord LansdowneJ

"[i]f

has conceded anything he has conceded it with

the full consent of Canada. Nay, upon her urgency."27

Appeasing

Canadian desire for a settlement was an additional benefit for
Great Britain's negotiation of the treaty.
Great Britain sought friendship and the Hay-Herbert treaty
provided friendship.

The treaty was an attempt to resolve the

Alaskan boundary dispute officially and legitimately.

Mere

importantly,

the treaty was to mark a new era of Anglo-American

friendship.

As the London Times noted,

the even-numbered

tribunal was "an effort to settle differences by friendly
discussion,

and implies a high degree of confidence on each side

in the equity and friendship of the other.'"18

This confidence and

equity would present Great Britain and the United States with a
lasting bond.

After all in the words of the Times, the tribunal

would be "settling the points in dispute in the only manner that
leaves no sense of soreness or disappointment.'"19

Clearly,

the

Treaty's tribunal system was seen as important to prevent hostile
reaction to a settlement.
The Hay-Herbert treaty did have drawbacks for the British.
One considerable British disadvantage was that the treaty did not

British urgency to ratify the Treaty. As a result it was ratified
before the Canadian government officially responded to the treaty.
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force the United States into arbitration.

The British were still

embittered from being forced to arbitrate the Venezuelan boundary
dispute.4

In early negotiations,

they sought some retribution by

seeking to force the Americans into arbitration of this dispute.
The United States had championed arbitration between Venezuela
and Great Britain but now balked at the idea of submitting an
American dispute to arbitration.

Arthur H. Lee, a member of

Parliament, made sure to point out to Roosevelt,

"the

inconsistent attitude of the U.S. in this matter."30

However,

the

Hay-Herbert treaty only contained one mention of the word
"arbitral" in the preamble.

This reference was due to what

President Roosevelt called "an unfortunate accident on the part
of the copyist.”31

The offensive word was soon removed.

London Times acknowledged the Americans'

belief that the members

were representatives of the country, not arbitrators.32
of formal arbitration was, in the words of Laurier,
slight blemish."33

The

This lack

"a single

The British seemed to agree and overlooked

this opportunity for petty retaliation.
Aside from the lack of any arbitration,

the Hay-Herbert

treaty created an almost ideal situation for the British.

They

e Lord Lansdowne (Henry Charles Keith Petty-Fitzmaurice) was the British
Foreign secretary.
: The Venezuelan boundary crisis (1895-96) arose from arguments over the
proper border between Venezuela and British Guiana. The main dispute
focused on the Orinoco River. Venezuela appealed to the United States
to enforce the Monroe Doctrine in-order to force the British to
arbitrate the issue. The United States to up the takes of demanding
arbitration.
In the end, the British (facing German threats in South
Africa) agreed with the United States to arbitrate the border.
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could end the Alaskan boundary dispute on terms acceptable to
both the Canadians and Americans,
Anglo-American friendship.

thereby encouraging a new

After all,

in the words of the London

Times, the treaty was "a new and lasting bond of union between
the two countries, both of whom at last see that neither has any
separate interest so vital as friendship between both."34

The

British it seems were the biggest winners in the Hay-Herbert
treaty.

They would be satisfying the Canadians and Americans

while promoting a stronger Anglo-American bond,

at a time when it

was sorely needed.
After reviewing the benefits and drawbacks of the treaty in
relation to each country,

it is clear to see the Hay-Herbert

treaty was if nothing else a beneficial accomplishment through
the time of its negotiation.

The treaty held important benefits

for the governments of the United States, Canada,
Britain,

and Great

all three of which seemed anxious to end the Alaskan

boundary dispute.

Where the treaty should rank in historical

significance is another issue, but the London Times remarked
that,

"(i]t is probaoly on the whole a greater diplomatic triumph

for all concerned than was the Hay-Pauncefote treaty9 or any
other of recent times."35

The treaty was the best solution the

circumstances would permit.

However,

the friendly goals of the

9 The Hay-Pauncefote treaty, signed between the United States and Great
Britain, allowed the United States to build the Panama Canal but barred
the United States from fortifying the canal. The Treaty replaced the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850, which required joint Anglo-American
construction.
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treaty would be overshadowed by the actions of Theodore Roosevelt
and Canadian reaction to them.
On February 4, 1903, Sir Wilfrid Laurier expressed his
pleasure with finally creating a mechanism for settling the
boundary,

and his hope that "a strong body of jurists will

forever dispose of that question."36
of the Hay-Herbert trial.

This was the intended legacy

It was an understanding among friends

to overcome an obstacle in that friendship.

Unfortunately this

aspect of the Alaskan boundary dispute has been overlooked and
under-appreciated because of the actions that would follow the
signing of the Hay-Herbert Treaty.

ROOSEVELT'S ACTIONS

The Hay-Herbert Treaty provided a settlement,
friendly terms.

on basically

However, the beneficial aspects of the treaty

never had an opportunity to develop.

Almost immediately after

the announcement of the treaty friction began to develop.

The

central problems resulted from President Roosevelt's appointees
and political actions.

These aspects provided the Canadian

public and later Canadian historians with the evidence they
needed to support the Canadian commissioners'

claims.

However,

these actions and appointments have been unfairly emphasized.
This evidence, which is the focus of most histories of the
Alaskan boundary dispute, has been taken at face value and not
critically analyzed.
The United States Senate ratified the Hay-Herbert Treaty on
February 11,

1903.

Senator Henry Cabot Lodge was in charge of

getting it through the Senate.

In order to secure passage,

Lodge

was compelled to tell certain senators who Roosevelt's appointees
would b e .J' However a "clever strategy" still had to be employed
to secure ratification.2

The Treaty was sent to an executive

committee during a period when the senate chamber was empty.

The

treaty was still in trouble until it was disclosed that Roosevelt
would appoint Senator Lodge,

Senator George Turner,
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and Secretary
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of War Elihu Root as the American commissioners.

The

ratification vote was taken by a voice vote without a listing of
yeas and nays.

Ratified treaties were exchanged March 3, 1903.3

The members of the Tribunal were to be appointed
immediately.4

When the final treaty was signed, Roosevelt's

appointments of the "impartial jurists of repute" the treaty
mandated,

instead resembled representative commissioners.J

Great

Britain and Canada were expecting United States Supreme Court
Justices to be appointed to the tribunal.

Roosevelt seemed aware

of this desire when in the words of historian Allen Nevins,
Roosevelt made "the gesture of inviting Supreme Court justices to
act."6
President Roosevelt "it would appear" asked all the judges
of the Supreme Court to be American jurist for the tribunal.7

No

direct evidence is available to support the actual request of the
Justices, but Hay reported to Ambassador Herbert that all the
Supreme Court judges were asked to serve.8

However,

the

forcefulness of Roosevelt's approach may be questioned.
he had no problem persuading Root to serve.

It seems

In Root's words,

"the President drafted me--I should say impressed me--shanghaied
m e — into the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal."9

However,

one does not

get the feeling that the Justices felt subject to the same
pressure.
Public outcry in Canada began almost immediately.

The

Manitoba Free Press declared the American appointees "have
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expressed themselves in anything but an impartial manner upon the
points involved in the dispute."10

The London Times Ottawa

correspondent echoed this sentiment by saying it was unlikely the
American commissioners would take an "unbiased view of the
evidence."11

The New York correspondent tried to counter these

claims saying he knew of no objection and any objection could not
be "entirely valid.1,12

However,

the fact of the matter was many

Canadians found dissatisfaction with Lodge,

Turner,

and Root for

various reasons.
Henry Cabot Lodge was the most objectionable in the view of
most Canadians.

Both Lodge and President Roosevelt knew the

Canadians viewed the Senator negatively.
letter to the President,

Lodge remarked,

in a

that he was "not popular in Ottawa."i3

Lodge had always been an outspoken opponent of the Canadians'
claims.

As early as 1896, Lodge had called the claims "trumped

up and manufactured to an extent that strained credulity."14
Secretary Hay also regarded Lodge as a "regrettable" choice
calling him a "most evil genii", who acted "as if the devil were
inspiring him."15

This was due in large measure to the fact that

Lodge simply would not remain silent about his views on the
issue.

Lodge made a speech in Boston claiming that "no nation

with an ounce of self-respect could admit the justice of Canada's
contention."16

Speeches such as this,

Lodge as "uncompromising",
countered,

fueled Canadian claims of

"aggressive",

and "bitter".17

Lodge

"Those were only political speeches" and at the
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tribunal "I shall have to take an oath to consider the evidence
impartially and I shall do so."18
note that John Garraty,

However,

it is important to

Lodge's biographer, maintained "if Lodge

really believed that he was going to be an impartial judge he was
surely deceiving himself and no one else."19

Most likely, Lodge

was defending himself to avoid being removed from the tribunal
and knew he would not be impartial.

In fact, "Senator Lodge was

an aggressive nationalist."20
As if Lodge's bias was not enough to infuriate the
Canadians,

he also lacked the legal experience to make him a

highly qualified jurist.

His legal resume included Harvard Law

school but no experience in legal practice.

The Canadian claim

that Lodge was not impartial or experienced seem to be well
founded.

The reason Lodge was selected was "because he wanted to

go and because he was the President's close friend and advisor."2'
1
Lodge was also an important figure in American foreign relations.
Roosevelt’s second appointment was Elihu Root.

Root was

the nation's Secretary of War, a position the Canadians found
hard to reconcile with an impartial jurist.

Root's legal

background was sound and he was considered one of the top legal
minds in America.

Root had the "highest legal attainment and

[wasj of unimpeachable personal integrity."22

However,

as the

Secretary of War and he reported directly to the President.
Also,

in that capacity Root had been the first United States

official to send the military into the area in question.23

With

66

such strong ties to the President, R o o t ’s appointment was
questionable in the minds of the Canadians.

While he may have

been "less strongly committed than his colleagues," he certainly
left much to be desired by the Canadians.24

It must be noted

however that Root had already decided to resign his duties as
Secretary of War when he was appointed to the tribunal.25
Senator Turner was the least known among Roosevelt's
appointees.

The immediate reaction in Canada was dislike for

Turner because he was from Washington state.

John Ewart

explained:
That, no doubt, is far from conclusive as to his
partiality. But this much may be said: that decision
in favor of Canada would have been easier for any
other man in the United States (except members of the
government) than for a politician of the state of
Washington and a resident of Spokane.20
Turner was in fact from Washington, but an in-depth examination
of him is consistently left out of most histories of the Alaskan
boundary dispute.

Therefore,

a closer look into Turner's life

will perhaps shed light on his appropriateness as an "impartial
jurist of repute."
George Turner was born in Missouri in 1850.

At the age of

19 and without attending law school, he was admitted to the Bar
in Alabama.27

This was probably a result of his "inquiring mind

and a photographic memory."28

Turner served as a Federal Marshal

and was an important member of the Republican party in Alabama.
As a result of his work he was awarded a judgeship.
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Turner became a Judge on the Supreme Court for the
Territory of Washington from 1884 to 1888.29
judge,

he returned to the practice of law.

and regarded as "a

After this term as a
Turner was successful

'born' lawyer" to whom "the basic principles

of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence come as naturally to his mind as do
the lips of the babe to the mother's milk."30
In 1897, Turner returned to politics, but this time as a
Democrat.

Turner was elected to the United States Senate on a

fusionist® platform.

While in the Senate, Turner was an

outspoken critic of imperialism in the Philippines.
opposed the Spanish-American War,

He also

insisting the United States

should proclaim the independence of Cuba before entering the
conflict.31
In relation to the Alaskan boundary claims, Turner had
spoken out prior to his appointment to the Commission.

However,

his biographer Claudis Johnson claims Turner spoke in favor of
the United States claims "but not in a jingoist manner."32

As for

his selection to the tribunal, "[i]t was generally reported that
Senators Foraker, Lodge,
Turner."33

Spooner, and Perkins recommended

What Roosevelt "probably did not know about Turner—

What Che Senator's friends and a few others did know— was that he
might be equal to the strain of voting against the claims of the
United States if upon evidence presented, they should prove to be

aThe fusionist members that elected Turner were the Silver Republicans,
Populists, and Democrats.
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unfounded."34

It appeared apparent to Secretary Hay in his letter

to Ambassador Choate when he remarked,
Turner is one of the most prominent lawyers west of
the Rocky Mountains, and represents a great body of
opinion there which has always been more or less
hostile to England, and his influence and standing
will be most valuable in influencing the opinion of
the Northwestern states in favor of a just and
amicable settlement.35
Turner's connection to the Northwest was seen as benefit to the
Americans.

In the event that a decision was made in favor of

Canadian claims,

it was important to have a respected and

influential member who was associated with the area which would
be most hostile.

His selection meant a voice to calm an angry

section of the country,

if need be.

While the general trend in the historiography of the
Alaskan Boundary dispute is to follow Ewart's assumption that
Turner's connection to the Northwest made him an unqualified
selection to the tribunal,
Turner.

Charles Tansill,

the dispute,

the one notable American historian of

thought that, "[t]he British objections to Turner

were unreasonable."36
Northwest,

this would be an unfair assessment of

While Turner was still from the Pacific

March 1903 is term as a senator from Washington

ended.
In the end, Roosevelt's selections were within reason.
After all, the President had appointed a close friend and leading
senator

(who was crucial in the ratification of the treaty), his

top advisor

and a representative who could explain any award to

69
those most opposed to any negotiation.

The appointments were far

from the claim that they "utterly violated the terms of this
article."3' And certainly offer little support for Frederick
Gibson's claim that, "The inescapable,
deplorable,

and at the same time

conclusion is that if these men could have been said

to be impartial they would not have been appointed."38

These were

certainly not the best choices but after reflecting on their
actions during the award, any lasting apprehension about their
selection should be dismissed.
Roosevelt's appointees,
overemphasized.

As regards the selection of

perhaps the Canadian reaction was

0. D. Skelton remarked, "So far as the actual

decision of the tribunal was concerned,

it is doubtful whether

the change in the personnel of the court made any material
difference.

Experience does not show that judges, however fair

in the handling of details of evidence,

are any more immune than

other mortals from the national or social prejudices which
unconsciously shape interpretation."39
The crucial measure in evaluating the appointments is their
ability to meet the qualifications set out in the Ray-Herbert
treaty.
Turner,

They were to be "impartial jurists of repute."40

Lodge,

and Root have been unfairly categorized as not meeting

this standard.

The Canadians may have been under the impression

that the jurists were to be juages but according to Webster's
Third New International Dictionary a jurist is 1. A person who
practices law; 2. A person skilled in the philosophy or science
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of law.41

All the American appointments meet these requirements.

As for repute,

it no argument can be made against these

individuals as to their position,

rank, or status.

The final

requirement of impartiality is subject to interpretation.
However,

their actions during the tribunal speak against the

notion that they were prejudicial or biased.
However,

that did not stop later historians from

criticizing the selections.

Roosevelt's appointments according

to Gibson were a "demonstration of international chicanery ."4i
And Roosevelt "was guilty of serious diplomatic dishonesty" in
those appointments.43
"Very moderate criticism of these appointments by Sir
Wilfrid Laurier in the Canadian House of Commons enraged
Roosevelt" who wrote a letter on March 25,
jurists not to compromise.44

1903 instructing

He directed the jurists as to what

was open for discussion and what was not.

He acknowledged that

they would "of course impartially judge the questions that come
before you for decision."

However, more importantly,

he stated

"...the claim to Skagway and Dyea, and therefore of course Pyramid
Harbor,

is not in my judgement one of those which can properly be

considered open to discussion."45
problem,

This statement created a vast

for the major Canadian contention was not even to be

contemplated by Roosevelt's jurists.

However,

all information
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available suggests little attention was paid to these
instructions by the jurists.13
Roosevelt was confident in the American claim.
Roosevelt being Roosevelt,

However,

he wanted it perfectly clear that he

expected a victory.

He began to issue political threats to the

British government.

The most famous example of Roosevelt's

bullying is his letter to Justice Oliver W. Holmes, who was in
London in July 1903.

Roosevelt took this opportunity to exploit

Holmes's personal relationship with Colonial Secretary Joseph
Chamberlain.
Roosevelt framed the letter as a response to Holmes's
letter,

yet was careful to add,

"...if you happen to meet

Chamberlain again you are entirely at liberty to tell him what I
say...."46

Roosevelt then proceeded to lay out his view of the

Alaskan situation.
He claimed the reason for his consent to the tribunal was
due only to his "very earnest desire" for good Anglo-American
relations.

He maintained the Canadians'

all but "two or three lesser points."

case lacked warrant on

After his explanation for

consenting to the tribunal, he then issued a series of threats.
Roosevelt declared that if the commission failed to decide the
issue,

he would "request Congress to make an appropriation which

will enable me to run the boundary on my own hook."47

Roosevelt

b Turner claimed he told Roosevelt he was not going to decide the case
until he heard all the arguments according to a letter that ha wrote in
twenty years later.
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had begun wielding his Big Stick.
the Canadian claim,

He re-emphasized his view of

saying the Canadian claim was "as

indefensible as if they should now suddenly claim the island of
Nantucket" and "no more worth discussing than the claim that the
49th parallel meant the 50th parallel or else the 48th."48

He also

sought to make it clear that this would be the "one last effort"
at diplomatic settlement of the boundary.
Roosevelt made it clear that if the Tribunal did not agree
"there will be no arbitration of the matter" instead he would
"take a position which will prevent any possibility of
arbitration hereafter...."

The Americans would simply lay out the

boundary "without any further regard to the attitude of England
and Canada."

Roosevelt concluded his letter by stating he should

have taken this action in the first place, but had refused
because of his "wish to exhaust every effort to have the affair
settled peacefully and with due regard to England's dignity."49
Roosevelt's letter exhibits his unyielding stance,

along with his

efforts to influence the British government and, through it, the
British judge.
Roosevelt also had his staff hard at work.

Roosevelt

encouraged everyone he could to apply pressure to the British
jurist Lord Alverstone.

The First Secretary of the United States

Embassy at London, Henry White, hoped to tell Lord Alverstone,
that the Americans "have consented to the arbitration in order to
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afford [Canada] a loophole to escape from an untenable
p o s i t i o n ."50
Roosevelt's strong efforts to encourage an outcome
favorable to the Americans would not go unnoticed by the
Canadians.

The Canadians presented strong opposition to

Roosevelt's actions.
Roosevelt selected.
of the tribunal,

They started with attacks on the jurists
Eventually,

they would attack the decision

an effort that would negatively color the award

as well as the Hay-Herbert treaty.
The Canadians began to see their worst fears realized.
Canada had always viewed the United States with a sense of
apprehension.

They were wary of any actions their larger

neighbor might take that could possibly be interpreted as
aggressive.

The Canadians were quick to interpret Roosevelt's

actions in the most negative light.
Roosevelt.

Canada felt betrayed by

In the words of one Canadian Minister,c it was

"evident the United States desired to convert the proceedings
into a farce."51

Canadians began to threaten that,

"unless the

United States acts up to both the letter and the spirit of the
Alaskan Boundary Treaty no meeting of the commission will be
held."52
The first Canadian objection was to Roosevelt's
appointments.

Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier attempted to induce

England to force different appointments.

He submitted a

° This most likely refers to Minister of Interior Clifford Sifton.
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memorandum to England stating Canada's objections to Root, Lodge,
and Turner.53

The British government refused, and as the Manitoba

Free Press fatefully explained,

"All that Canada can d o . .. is to

protest against their appointment,

as not being in accordance

with the treaty, and that has been done."54
little recourse.

The Canadians had

The Canadians would have to accept the American

appointments.
The Canadian government had entered into the Hay-Herbert
Treaty with at least some expectation of losing its case.
However,
fair.

it anticipated the tribunal's award to be viewed as

The Canadian government expected the Canadian public to be

satisfied.

President Roosevelt’s actions turned the Canadian

public away from the complacency expected in association with
Canadian defeat.

As Canadian historian John Ewart concluded,

"[n]o one, however,
treachery,

imagined that,

this time, dishonor and

rather than mere compliance, would be the principal

feature attending the loss of another bit of Canadian
territory."55

The Canadians,

always in fear of being cheated by

the United States, were beginning to believe they had been
"hoodwinked."56

Canadians natural prejudice towards the United

States influenced them to react negatively to President
Roosevelt's actions.
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The British appointed one commission,

Lord Alverstone.d

Alverstone was the Lord Chief Justice of England.

He had also

served as attorney general for over twelve years.

His selection

was greeted warmly by both the Canadians and Americans.

Great

Britain's other two selections were left to Canada to make.
After receiving word of the American appointments the
Canadians tightened their own ranks.

They followed the letter of

the treaty and appointed personnel with legal experience.

The

Canadians selected Sir Louis Jette, a former member of the
Supreme Court, and John D. Armour,

the Chief Justice of Ontario.

Armour's death in the summer of 1903 resulted in the appointment
of Allen B. Aylesworth,

a prominent Toronto lawyer.

The

Canadians clearly appointed less outspoken jurists. However,
their actions during the Tribunal present evidence that neither
of the Canadian judges had any likelihood of voting against his
country.
The Canadians also engaged in political threats.

When word

leaked that the Lord Alverstone might vote for the Americans,
Prime Minister Laurier declared,

"(i]f we are thrown over by

[the] Chief Justice, he will give the last blow to British
Diplomacy in Canada.

He should be plainly told this."57

This

quasi-threat of Canadian independence reflects the Canadian

d The title of Viscount (Baron) Alverstone was bestowed on
Richard Evarard Webster in 1900.
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situation.

The Canadians,

aware of Roosevelt's threats,

responded with pressure and diplomatic threats of their own.
The Canadian claims were questionable from the beginning.
The Canadian prospects:
were never good because the Canadian and imperial
governments, faced with the terms of the Anglo-Russian
treaty of 1825, which were vague and bore little
relation to the terrain to which they were to apply,
had done practically nothing between 1870 and 1896 to
prepare a case and prevent claims from being
solidified by a quarter of a century of tacit
acquiescence by Canada.58
Also,
The Canadian case was weak in that for seventy years
the assumption of Russia and the United States that
the lisiere was unbroken had gone virtually
unchallenged, and British maps as well as Russian and
American had shown the boundary running around the
heads of the inlets.59
In addition to the lack of activity and maps, Canada "made claims
so extensive that it had overreached itself in terms of a
settlement by arbitration or by judicial process."00
Instead of solidifying the claims in which they did have, Canada
expanded its claims.

As the claims got greater and greater,

it

was easier to lump them all together into one "ridiculous and
preposterous claim,
John Foster,

just as weak as it could be."61

in an article for National Geographic,

pointed

out the historical view England had taken on such matters in
international law.

He quoted the Duke of Wellington,

who wrote

in 1822:
Enlightened statesmen and jurists have long held as
insignificant all titles of territory that are not
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founded on actual occupation, and that title is, in
the opinion of the most esteemed writers on public
law, to be established by practical use.62
Russia had established possession and sold it to the United
States.

While Great Britain and Canada watched,

States had further developed the area.

the United

Finally it was time for

the presentation of the cases.
The arguments of the case would be overshadowed by
Roosevelt's actions.

Roosevelt's actions strengthened the

Canadian hostility towards the United States.
to interpret any actions as hostile.

Canada was quick

Unfortunately,

Roosevelt's

actions provided all the evidence Canada needed to justify its
fear of American power.

THE AWARD

The award of the Tribunal,

settling the Alaskan boundary

dispute, was based upon the answering of seven questions.

The

decision was not fully in favor of either party, but instead a
based on a combination of arguments used by both sides.

The

outcome generally favored the existing line held by the United
States.
The Convention of 1903 or Hay-Herbert Treaty established a
even-numbered tribunal.

The Tribunal had the responsibility of

answering the following seven questions regarding the Alaska
boundary:
1. What is intended as the point of commencement of the
line?
2. What channel is the Portland Channel?
3. What course should the line take from the point of
commencement to the entrance to Portland Channel?
4. To what point on the 56th parallel is the line to be
drawn from the head of the Portland Channel, and what
course should it follow between these points? 5
*
5. In extending the line of demarcation northward from the
said point on the parallel of the 56th degree of North
latitude, following the crest of the mountains situated
parallel to the coast until its intersection with the
141st degree of longitude west of Greenwich, subject to
the marine leagues from the ocean then the boundary
between the British and Russian territory should be
formed by a line parallel co the sinuosities of the
coast and distant therefrom < t more than ten marine
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leagues, was it the intention and meaning of said
convention of 1825 that there should remain in the
exclusive possession of Russia a continuous fringe or
strip of coast on the mainland, not exceeding ten marine
leagues in width, separating British Fossessions from
bays, ports, inlets, havens, and waters of the ocean,
and extending from the said point on the 56th degree of
latitude north to a point where such line of demarcation
should intersect the 141st degree of longitude west of
the Meridian of Greenwich?
6. If the foregoing question should be answered in the
negative, and in the event a summit of such mountains
proving to be in places more than ten marine leagues
from the coast, should the width of the lisiere which
was to belong to Russia be measured (1) from the
mainland coast of the ocean, strictly so-called, along a
line perpendicular thereto, or (2) was it the intention
and meaning of the said convention that where the
mainland coast is indented by deep inlets, forming part
of the territorial waters of Russia, the width of the
lisiere was to be measured (a) from the line of the
general direction of the mainland coast, or (b) from the
line separating the waters of the ocean from the
territorial waters of Russia, or (c) from the heads of
the aforesaid inlets? 7
7. What, if any exist, are the mountains referred to as
situated parallel to the coast, which mountains, when
within ten marine leagues from the coast, are declared
to form the eastern boundary?1
These seven questions were to be argued and presented to the
tribunal, which would make the decision which "shall be final and
binding upon all parties...."2
After ratification,

the treaty allowed for a maximum of two

months for each government to gather evidence and then exchange
the evidence gathered.

After exchanging evidence,

the treaty

allowed two months for each party to exchange counter-cases.
However,

a stipulation was added that "the tribunal may" extend
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that period for the explicit purpose of procuring "additional
papers and evidence."3
The British government made a request for a two-month
extension with a letter dated May 15, 1903, which Secretary Hay
received May 25.4

Great Britain requested,

on June 12, a list of

originals "which embraced practically all" of the United States
documents.

Secretary Hay denied the British request but gave

Britain the opportunity to verify that the United States had the
original copy of all the requested documents.

Great Britain was

forced to comply with the treaty and the counter cases were
exchanged July 3, 1903.5

However on August 10, another

application essentially the same as previous request was made by
Great Britain.

The United States replied that the documents were

enroute to London for the actual Tribunal and granted the British
government an inspection of the documents on August 31.
no inspection of the documents ever took place.6

However,

It would seem

the request was only made to buy time.
Great Britain was not the only side with complaints.
Ambassador Joseph Choate was helping J. W. Foster prepare the
American case.

Choate was being denied access to the "rich store

of papers in the Public Record Office bearing on the Alaska.
Question."7

However,

each party dealt with the situation and

prepared their cases for the first meeting of the Tribunal.
The Tribunal's first meeting occurred at the reception room
of the British Foreign Office on September 3, 1903.

The printed
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arguments of each country's counsels were presented at this first
meeting.

Elihu Root moved that Lord Alverstone should be

President of the Tribunal.

The motion carried unanimously.

The

Tribunal decided that the presentations would alternate from
Great Britain to the United States with each counsel.

The

Tribunal also opened the argument sessions to the public.

The

Tribunal then recessed until September 15, 1903.
The Tribunal reconvened on September 15.
Finaly3 began the British case at 11am.

Each session lasted from

11am to 4pm with a break at 1:30pm for lunch.
lasted for six and a half sessions.
Finaly's arguments,
for three sessions.

Sir Robert B.

Finaly's arguments

Upon the conclusion of

David Watsonb argued for the United States
Arguments continued with Christopher

Robinson0 presenting for two sessions for Canada,

followed by

Hannis Taylord for the United States for one session.

Sir Edward

Carson0 then took up the British argument for one and a half sessions.

Jacob M. Dickersonf for the United States ended with

three days of arguments.
arguments,

At the end of the eighteen days of oral

the Tribunal went into private deliberations on

October 8, 1903.*
9

3 Sir Robert Finlay, was the Attorney-General of England
b David T. Watson was an anti-trust lawyer.
c Christopher Robinson was a Canadian lawyer.
d Hannis Taylor was an expert in international law.
9 Sir Edward Carson was the Solicitor-General of England.
£ Jacob M. Dickinson had been a former Assistant Attorney General of the
United States.
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The governments took different, approaches to arguing their
case.

The British argued that a new interpretation of the

meaning of the words in the Treaty of 1825 was needed.
United States,

on the other hand, argued that previous actions of

each country had provided an interpretation.
terms,

The

"Essentially,

In the most basic

the British case was based on hermeneutics,

and the United States case on history."8

Arguments in favor of

each interpretation were laid down in the written cases and
counter cases.
The Tribunal received these written arguments and heard
oral arguments.

The basic function of the oral arguments was

"more truly one of clarification than actual persuasion."

The

information from the oral arguments was used in closed sessions
to actually decide the case.9

In order for the Tribunal to be as

informed and clear as possible, questions from the jurists were
allowed.

During the oral arguments the chief questions from the

jurists came from Aylesworth and Turner.10
The United States relied on maps as a major source cf
evidence.

It argued that the maps had consistently interpreted

the boundary to run outside of the inlets and through Observatory
Inlet.

As proof,

the United States submitted many maps including

a "Russian atlas, published in 1849,

[which] places the boundary

in Portland Canal, which it reaches by going east to Observatory
Inlet and then North."11

However,

the maps available to

negotiators varied considerably and "[t]he variation among these
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maps reduced their value greatly as proof."12

The United States

continued to argue the boundary running around the heads of the
inlets as being customary.
the contrary,

When Canadians supplied evidence to

the United States effectively argued "that

'customarily' did not mean 'invariably' and that custom seemed to
favor their position."13
Overall,
manner.

the oral arguments were discussed in a friendly

John W. Foster in closing his arguments,

remarked that

"during our prolonged sessions not a harsh word has been spoken,
nor an unpleasant incident occurred to mar the harmony of our
intercourse."14

He reported that it was "pleasing to state" the

United States agents were recipients of "marked courtesy and
consideration"

from “he British agents.i5

still apprehension in Canadian circles.

However,

there was

During the Tribunal,

Canadians maintained a bleak outlook on the Alaskan boundary
award.

On Saturday September 17,

1903,

the Manitoba Free Press

reported " [tjhere is an increasing amount of pessimism in
Canadian circles in London."16 This pessimism spread to Canada, as
Canadians waited for the award.
At noon on October 20, 1903, the final decision of the
Tribunal was deli'/ered.

The decision consisted of an award and

five maps describing the boundary line.9

The whole Tribunal

process had taken place in less then eight months.

John W.

Foster observed that "such a prompt result is almost without

9 The boundary line can be see on Map 5 on the next page.

Illustration 5: The Tribunal's Award
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parallel in the intercourse of nations."17

The Tribunal

unanimously agreed on Cape Muzon as the point of commencement.
The Tribunal also unanimously agreed that the boundary ran to the
north of Wales and Pearse Islands.

A majority of the Tribunal

agreed that the boundary line ran south of Sitkian Island and
Kannaghunut Island.

A majority also agreed that the line should

extend around the heads of the inlets and follow the mountains'
summit line marked on the maps issued with the award.

This

mountain line reached inland and did not follow the mountains
arising directly from the coast.

The mountain line also left a

large gap were "the evidence is not sufficient to enable the
Tribunal to say which are the mountains parallel to the coast
within the meaning of the Treaty/'18

An in-depth look at all the

questions will help to set the stage for the Canadian reaction to
the award.
Question one concerned the eastern and southern starting
point of the boundary.
point.

Cape Muzon

Cape Muzon was chosen as the starting

(located on 54 39' 38'' according to the

American survey and 54 39' 50'' according to the British)

is

actually not the southern tip of Prince of Wales Island (as the
1825 Treaty required).

It is the southern tip of Dali Island.

The Tribunal ruled that the signers of the 1825 Treaty had
believed Dali Island to be a promontory of Prince of Wales
Island.

Therefore it was the intert of the signers that the

boundary line commence at Cape Muzon.19
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Question two asked which channel was the Portland Channel.
The channel dispute affected the ownership of Kannaghunut,
Sitklan, Wales and Pearse islands found in-between the Pearse
Canal

(the Canadian claim)

claim).h

and Observatory Inlet

(the American

Secretary Hay maintained that the southern boundary

question "was not wholly in favor of either party."20

Compared

with the other questions the Portland Channel question was of
little concern going into the tribunal.

While both countries

argued their case, "neither nation contested strongly for their
possession.1,21
In reality both countries agreed on what channel was the
Portland Channel,

it was Portland Canal.

ended just north of the 55° latitude.
channels flowed to the Pacific.
other Observatory Inlet.

However,

Portland Canal

From that point,

two

One was the Pearse Canal the

In support of the their views,

the

British agents relied on Captain George Vancouver's narrative.22
The United States argued that there was a distinction between
Vancouver's Portland Canal and the one referred to by the
negotiators of 1825.

They also maintained the negotiators did

not have Vancouver's narratives.23
George Davidson*
1 explained the American view in 1903, which
was that the Portland Canal was
a three mile wide opening with bold approaches and
deep water, and not an obscure strait like Pearse

h See the map on the following page.
1 George Davidson was the President of the Geographical Society of the
Pacific.
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Illustration 6: Portland Channel Line
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Inlet of today, which is hidden by a number of islands
north of Point Wales and was condemned by Vancouver.24
According to Vancouver's narrative, Mr. Brown
companion)

exploring the area,

(his

found "[t]he principal

circumstance was that of his having sailed up a large opening,
whose southern entrance was in latitude 54° 4 5' ,"25
found it extend[ed]

"Mr. Brown

to north-westward, with several arms

branching from it in various directions to the latitude of 56°
20' .',26 Vancouver's narrative continues to say, "the entrance of
which he had visited,

and found it spacious and large, but had

not penetrated any distance into it."27

No mention of the smaller

Sitkian and Kannaghunut Islands was made in the correspondence of
the negotiators or in Vancouver's narratives.28
The decision to divide the four islands, which were claimed
by both sides, brought about the most controversy.
country had argued for splitting the islands,

Neither

so when the

Tribunal awarded Sitkian and Kannaghunut to the United States and
Wales and Pearse to Caxiada, suspicion of a compromise was
rampant. Canadians were the most upset.
The idea of splitting ownership of the islands first
occurred during the oral arguments.

On September 16, 1903,

during the third day of the Tribunal, Turner questioned Finlay
about the possibility that Tongass passage could be interpreted
as the mouth of Pearse Channel.29

Finlay responded that this

might have been possible but he thought it unlikely.30
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Lodge wrote Roosevelt as early as September 24,

1903,

saying "that we could afford, with a slight modification,
accept their Portland Channel."

This slight modification would

appear to be the splitting of the islands.
American commissioners,

to

It would appear the

if not the American counsels, were

prepared to split the four islands.31
On October 12, two American commissioners first raised and
"argued at length" the possibility of splitting the islands.32
During this discussion,

no mention of the value of the smaller

islands was made.
George Turner was the creator of the split island decision.
Once it appeared that the Tribunal would not award all four
Islands to the United States, Turner made a very careful study of
Vancouver's narrative.

He argued that Vancouver had thought

Tongas Passage was the natural outlet of Portland Channel.

He

pointed out that Vancouver made no mention of Kannaqhunut and
Sitkian Islands.3-

Therefore,

it would be reasonable that if the

negotiators of the Treaty had considered Pearse Canal to be
Portland Canal they would have also thought that Pearse Canal
flowed through the larger Tongass passage instead of the small
passage in-between Kanaghunut Island and the mainland.
On October 17 a vote was taken which split the islands.34
On the October 19, Jette and Aylesworth had a private conference
with Lord Alverstone.

In this conference the Canadians claimed

the two small islands were important strategic islands.

Lord
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Alverstone responded by telling the Canadians to bring it up
before the Tribunal.35

However, neither Jette or Aylesworth ever

brought up the strategic value of the islands before the
Tribunal.

The final award delivered to the public on October 20

proclaimed the "Tribunal unanimously agrees... [the boundary line]
passes to the north of Pearse and Wales island" and "majority of
the Tribunal" agrees it then flows through "the channel between
Wales and Sitklan Island called Tongass Channel."36
On the return of the American commissioners to the United
States,

President Roosevelt remarked that those two islands

should be called "Turner's Twins."37

However far from helping the

United States by saving two American islands,

this decision would

hurt the United States by leaving lasting Canadian bitterness.
Roosevelt was prepared to use those little islands "as a make
weight" or arbitrate them "before the Hague by preference."38

The

decision was seen by the Canadians as a compromise which may have
been of "slight importance had it not been for its psychological
effect."39

This psychological effect will be discussed in the

section dealing with Canada's reaction to the award.
Question four of the treaty dealt with the course the
boundary line should follow in the fifteen-mile gap between the
Portland Canal and the 56th parallel.

The Canadians maintained

that the line should meet up with their mountain line.

The

Americans believed it should be a straight line from the Portland

Channel.

In this regard the American claim was "tactically much
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stronger on this issue."40

In the end the Americans and

A1vers tone voted on the spot marked " D" on the map, which
followed the general mountain line favoring the Americans.41

The

chosen spot resembled more closely the American position.
Question five asked, "was it the intention and meaning... (of
the 1825 Treaty)

that there should remain in the exclusive

possession of Russia a continuous fringe or strip of coast on the
mainland?

This was the crucial question for the Tribunal.

It

would decide if Canada would get the harbor it desperately wanted
on the Alaskan Panhandle.
The arguments concerning question five revolved around the
meaning of sinuosities of the coast as used in the 1825 Treaty.
The Canadians maintained the sinuosities of the coast referred to
the break from the ocean, cutting off inlets less then six miles
wide.

This would leave the heads of inlets such as Lynn in

Canadian possession.

The Americans claimed that the sinuosities

of the coast moved in and out along the inlets, otherwise why
include the word "sinuosities."
Alverstone agreed with the American interpretation.

He

recorded his decision that the boundary "was to run round the
heads of the inlets,

and not to cross them."42

With Alverstone,

the Americans answered question five in the affirmative.

The

American definition was accepted.
Aylesworth and Jette dissented.

One reason for

Aylesworth's rejection was based on the points of the surveys of
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1892.

Aylesworth’s judgement seems to be flawed as he argued

these surveys as evidence for the coast starting at the mouths of
the inlets.

He thought this established the Canadian contention

that the boundary line started from the heads of the inlets.

In

reality the surveys were conducted from the rivers mouths at the
inlets'

ends not from the heads of the inlets.43

The actual

survey locations supported the American contention that the ocean
coast included the inlets.
Question six dealt with the question of where the tenleague line should commence if there was no continuous strip.
Since question five was answered in the affirmative,

no decision

was required for question six.
Question seven asked, which,
intended to form the boundary.

if any, mountains were

The difficult question for the

Tribunal was where in the sea of mountains that made up the
Alaskan Panhandle was the summit line parallel to the coast?
task was even more difficult because,

The

"Neither nation seemed to

establish its position regarding the mountains."44
The Americans claimed that the mountain chain the
negotiators of the 1825 Treaty intended to use as the boundary
did not exist.

The most important piece of American evidence

regarding the claim was Vancouver's map.J

According to

3 The United States argued the negotiators of the Treaty of 18'.5, did
have before them a copy of Vancouver's charts, but denied that those
negotiators had Vancouver's narratives.
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Vancouver's map,

there was a summit chain of mountains running

inland around the inlets.

It was clear Vancouver:

evidently intended to convey the information that
behind the continental shore there was a range, or
ranges, of mountains at distances obtained by
estimation, because he could not determine them with
the means he had, nor were their distances necessary
for his work.45
Because Vancouver estimated the distances, his chart showed a
distinct mountain chain.

It was this range that the United

States argued was the intention of the 1825 Treaty to make the
boundary.

In actuality,

these mountains did not form a chain,

therefore the boundary should revert to the stipulated ten-league
distance from the coast.
The Canadians argued that the area was full of mountains,
which it was, and that the mountains closest to the coast should
be chosen.

The Canadians claimed that parallel to the coast,

actually meant closest to the coast.

If not, then why describe

them as parallel to the coast and not the second mountain chain
running parallel to the mountains on the coast?

The Canadians

created a mountain line by linking mountain peaks close to the
coast.

The Canadian mountain line "consisted of some sixty peaks

which formed no crest or range."46
also crossed inlets,

The Canadians' mountain line

"an unusual attribute for a mountain

c rest."47
In the end,

a majority of the Tribunal decided that "the

mountains marked S" on their award map were the mountains
intended by the 1825 Treaty.

These mountains ran behind the
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heads of the inlets and were roughly 20 miles from the coast.
They certainly were not the mountains nearest the coast.

The

mountains selected did leave a large gap where "in the absence of
further survey the evidence was not sufficient" to decide which
mountains were intended.48

In the gap, the International Boundary

Commission later defined the boundary.
United States appointee,

0. H. Tittman was the

while the Canadians appointed W. F.

K i n g .49
The Canadian commissioners objected to the mountain line
awarded.

However,

their "opinions manifested the same apparent

weakness as has already been illustrated that the British view
contained."50

Since Canada's mountain chain went through inlets,

"the majority fulfilled the requirements of the treaty in a
better fashion than either of the alternative lines.51

Yet, on a

coast where "[i]n reality it was practically impossible to select
a real range of mountains" it was interesting that neither the
Americans nor Alverstone wrote a reason for the selection of
their mountains.52

This was especially troubling since their

interpretation "represented a significant departure from the
lines advocated by either of the disputants."53
The decision of the tribunal provided an award according to
the treaty.

The award tended to follow arguments of both cases

instead of clearly aligning with one country's claims.
of this, Canadians viewed the decision as a compromise.

Because
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Canadians believed this compromise resulted from political
pressure by the United States.

THE REACTIONS

The most prominent aspect of the Alaskan boundary dispute
was not so much the final award but the reaction to the award.
The award was generally accepted in the United States and
received little attention in Great Britain.

The lasting reaction

of Canada provided a large amount of the historical importance
for the Alaskan boundary dispute.

This reaction consisted of

outrage towards Lord Alverstone and the Tongass Passage decision.
The final award of the Alaskan boundary tribunal favored
the United States'

claims.

The Canadians were cut off from any

deep harbor ports via the Alaskan panhandle.

The most curious

aspect of the Tribunal's award was the decision to declare that
the southern boundary ran through the Tongass Pass.

The product

of the Tongass Pass decision was that two of the four islands in
question would be given to the United States while the remaining
two would be given to Canada.

The Canadian outcry was enormous

against what they perceived as a diplomatic rather than judicial
interpretation of the boundary.

In the words of John Hay,

it

gave C a n a d a :
those two little Islands—worth nothing to us.
That is
all poor Canada gets by the decision, and I do not
wonder they are furious but as Will Thomson used to
say ‘Serves'erc right, if they can't take a joke.1
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It was the joke that infuriated Canada,

not the award.

The

Canadians were frustrated by the way the decision was reached.
From early on, one observer had noted, "the people of Canada will
be satisfied if it is made clear that there has been no truckling
to the United States."2

However,

appeasement of the United

States was exactly the result Canada saw in the award, especially
in respect to Tongass Pass.

They felt the award reflected

political and diplomatic power relationships.
The Canadian commissioners further roused Canadian
resentfulness by refusing to sign the award.

In the opinion of

the Canadian jurist L. A. Jette, "I found it impossible, under
such circumstances,
Canadian jurist,

to concur" with the decision.3

A. B. Aylesworth stated that he dissented

altogether with the award.'1

The Canadian jurists began to play

the political instead of judicial game.
award and

The other

ending the matter,

Instead of signing the

they chose not to concede gracefully

and refused to sign.
Refusing to sign was a right of the Canadians.
well within their prerogative not to sign the award.
what was not acceptable was their public statement.

They were
However,
The Canadian

commissioners issued a statement that would bias Canadian
interpretation for years.

The Commissioners stated that the

position of the United States'

two little islands "wholly

destroys the strategic value" of the Canadian islands, contending
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that "they command the entrance to Portland Channel, to
Observation Inlet, and the ocean passage to Port Simpson."5
Lord Alverstone claimed that no suggestion was ever made in
regards to the strategic value of the smaller islands.
Aylesworth acknowledged that no mention was made of the islands'
value.6

However, Aylesworth stated he had not mentioned their

value because he had not wanted to admit it in front of the
Americans, whom he regarded as Canada's enemy.

The Canadian

legacy of fearing the United States seemed to have engrossed
Aylesworth.

While, thf. American jurists may have seemed less

than qualified in Canadian minds, they were hardly enemies of
Canada. Aylesworth's animosity towards the American members
brings into question

selection as an impartial jurist.

As for the significance of the islands,

the Canadians

claimed that they controlled the entrance to Port Simpson.
importance was placed on Port Simpson since 1885.
construction of a railroad from Churchill
Port Simpson was under consideration.
route across Canada.

Great

The

(on Hudson's Bay)

to

The line was the shortest

The railroad offered the hope that the line

"must one day become a great highway of commerce for trans
pacific trade."7
fully realized.

However, the dreams for Port Simpson were never
In regards to the strategic value of the

American islands. Lord Minto stated "no one considering the
matter in its military aspect could possible accept such an
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opinion,

in fact it was an absolutely misleading statement of the

case.... "8
The Tongass Passage decision was not just about the value
of the two islands awarded to the United States.

The chief loss

for the Canadians was not strategic or economic but "the patently
non-judicial character of that decision."9

The Canadian

commissioners saw the main reason for this decision as Lord
Alverstone compromising with the Americans.

The Commissioners'

statement accused Alverstone of making a diplomatic rather than a
judicial decision,
Alverstone was outraged at the personal attack aimed at
him.

He would write in his autobiography that:
The [Alaskan! papers were very voluminous, and after
studying them carefully and hearing all the arguments,
I came to the conclusion that I could not support the
main contention of Canada as regarded the boundary,
and acting purely in a judicial capacity, I was under
the painful necessity of differing from my two
Canadian colleagues.10

However,

as for the personal attack,

responded,

in private,

to Aylesworth.

Lord Alverstone promptly
He declared Aylesworth's

claims were unjust and should have been made to him and not to
the London T imes.11

Aylesworth responded that the statement to

the Times was not a "hasty or i n c o n s i d e r a t e action" but instead
"an explanation to the people of Canada,

of this most lamentable

business."12
When word of the Canadian Commissioners'
concerning their refusal to sign the treaty,

statement
reached Canada,
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Lord Lansdowne3 rightly considered any such statement as
"deplorable."

Clifford Sifton,

the chief agent on the Canadian

side, and Lord Minto, Canadian Governor-General both seem to have
objected to the actions of the Canadian commissioners.

Lord

Minto's conversation with Sifton expressed their shared belief
that the Aylesworth and Jette did not appreciate "their
responsibilities as commissioners."13

Alyesworth and Jette seem

to have overstepped their responsibilities in the Alaskan
boundary affair.
Prime Minister Laurier had a different reaction.

He wrote

that the concessions of Kannaghunut and Sitklan Islands was "one
of those concessions which have made British diplomacy odious to
Canadian people,

and it will have most lamentable effect."14

Whether the Canadian commissioners'

statement received the

endorsement of the Canadian government or not, the legacy of the
Alaska boundary tribunal would be forever influenced by their
statement.
award.15

Canadians saw proof of "their worst fear" in the

The commissioners claimed the process had not been fair,

the Canadian people responded with "an explosion of wrath that
reverberated from one end of the dominion to the other."16
The statement the Canadian commissioners produced effected
the Canadian public's outlook towards the award.

The Winnipeg

Telegram seems to have seen the deep impact early on when it
reported:

Lord Lansdowne was the Governor General of Canada.
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It [the statement by the Canadian commissioners] is a
veritable firebrand thrown into the inflammable
material of Canadian suspicion of Britain's partiality
for the good-will of the United States.
So serious is
the act that it is a national and Imperial crime
unless deliberate injustice was done beyond the shadow
of a doubt.17
The commissioners'

statements certainly promoted a hostile

environment in Canada.

This hostile environment was not

necessarily a direct result of the tribunal's award, but rather a
product of the commissioners’ reaction to the award.
Mail and Empire questioned,

The Toronto

"Is it possible that this Alaskan

incident is being used illogically,

and as it appears

untruthfully, with mischievous ends in view?""8

The issue began

to be used as propaganda for independence and Canadian control of
its own foreign relations.
Liberal Party Canadian established the Alaskan boundary
award as a source to promote Canadian control over their foreign
relations,

if not outright independence.

As word of the decision

reached Canada, public opinion reflected Canadian dissatisfaction
with Great Britain.

The Toronto World claimed Canada was

"Sacrificed on the Altar of Diplomacy to make Britain solid with
the United States."

The Toronto Globe declared,

"Canadian

interests have been sacrificed by Lord Alverstone."
Peterborough Times announced that Canadians had been,
our rights."

The
"Robbed of

While the St. John Telegraph explained "Canada was

tricked in the Alaskan dispute."

The Vancouver Province held

that Canada had been "led like a lamb to the slaughter."19
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Throughout Canada the Alaskan boundary dispute was associated
with Great Britain's sacrifice of Canadian interests to the
United

>tates.

The award became a standard piece of evidence

when illustrating Great Britain's negligence concerning Canadian
affairs.
Much of the Canadians'

anger focused on Lord Alverstone.

Alverstone was aware that his "conduct in giving this decision
was the subject of violent and unjust criticism on the part of
some Canadians...

for a considerable time."20

He claimed that,

think reflection resulted in a fairer judgment."21

"I

He also

maintained "I only came to this decision with the greatest
reluctance,

and nothing but a sense of my duty to my position

influenced me."22

However, Alverstone was mistaken in his belief

that Canada had realized his position.

As we will see,

the

history of the Alaskan boundary dispute would focus on his
''treachery" for decades to come.23
The immediate reaction to the award varied in each country
involved..

"In the United States it was received with jubilation,

in Great Britain with relief,

and in Canada with indignation."24

Each country's reaction helped to later define the historiography
of the dispute.
In Great Britain,

the award was seen primarily as promoting

Anglo-American relations.

It was the end of a dispute.

The

British government may not have gotten the result it had most
hoped for, but the matter was finally solved.

As for the

103
Canadian claims,

the London Times clearly pointed out the British

feeling that there was a difference "between being driven from
disputed territory and consenting to abandon a claim to its
future sovereignty and occupation."25

Great Britain downplayed

the importance of the territory.
In the United States, the view was that the Alaskan
boundary was where it should be and was always believed to have
been.

The Americans seemed to gloss over the fact that America

lost an area roughly the size of Rhode Island in the award.
Teddy Roosevelt called the award, a "the greatest diplomatic
victory of our times."
the Canadians.

Roosevelt's statement further inflamed

And in a historical sense,

little note was taken

of the fact that because of the award, the size of the United
States actually was reduced.
indignation was dismissed as

For the general public,

”Canada['s]

[the] irritation of a poor loser."20

This reaction was seen in the comics of the day.b
In Canada,
newspapers.

the public was outraged, as seen in the

To Canadians,

complaint of a poor loser.

their anger "was not the petulant
It was the just anger of the man who

considered himself the victim of a confidence game."2'

This

outrage fueled the early historical interpretation of the Alaskan
boundary dispute.
The critical moment in the Alaskan boundary dispute was not
the actual award,

D

See next page.

but the public statement by the Canadian
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M o t h e r E n g l a n d : " C o m e , Johnny, take your medicine
like a m a n ; e v e n -body is laughing at you, a nd S a m m y is
"whistling for you to c o m e out a n d play.”
F r o m the Xcu'$-Tribunc (Duluth).
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commissioners.

The public statement was embraced by factions

calling for greater Canadian autonomy.

These factions connected

British neglect with the Alaskan award by using the
Commissioners'

statement.

THE HISTORIOGRAPHICAL LEGACY

In order to best understand the historiography of the
Alaskan boundary dispute, a basic understanding of major trends
in Canadian historiography is needed.

The following is intended

to serve only as a broad generalization; however,

it is important

for the basic understanding it provides United States-Canadian
relations and specifically the Alaskan boundary dispute.
Early English-Canadian historians focused on the
constitutional development of Canada.

The main focus was that

through a long slow process Canada had gradually gained freedom
though responsible government.

This Constitutional development

history centered on Canada's relationship with Britain.

It was

only during the late 1920s that Canadian historians began to
"explore in detail" Canada's relationship with the United
St a t e s .1
During the 1920's and 1930's, Canada began to recognize the
United States as "Canada's Friend."2

It was also during this

time that Canadian Nationalists began "an exaggerated and
misguided pursuit of

'autonomy.'"3

It is important to understand

the significance the Alaskan boundary dispute took on in terms of
Anglo-Canadian relations.

The Canadians positioned the dispute
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squarely in favor of increased autonomy.

The award was analyzed

by the effect it had on Canadian-British relations.
focused mainly on the Alverstone's treachery.

Scholarship

Only later during

the 1960s and 1970s would a broad movement push the Alaskan
boundary dispute into a Canadian-American relationship.

The

focus shifted towards Roosevelt's actions.
John Ewart was the first to publish a major study of the
Alaskan boundary dispute.

He was an Ottawa lawyer and author of

sixty pamphlets from 1908-1932.

Generally, Ewart's works argued

that "Canada must declare its complete equality with Great
Britain and remain linked to her only by a common monarch."4
Ewart was an advocate of "the removal of all symbols of colonial
status."3

Ewart's studies tended to expose British neglect.

Ewart was especially hard on the Lord Alverstone in
relation to the Alaskan boundary dispute.

His sizable essay on

the dispute centered around the "treachery of Lord Alverstone."0
Ewart in his essay on the Alaskan Boundary displayed strong wrath
even five years after the fact.

Ewart was especially severe on

the Portland Channel decision.
Alverstone had actually drafted an award supporting the
Canadian contention that all four islands would belong to Canada.
Ewart received a copy of the first judgement and compared it to
the second judgment.

Ewart claimed "not one of these alterations

materially supported the conclusion of the second judgment."’
Ewart was outraged that "with the change of one word in one
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clause,

the omission of two words in another clause; and the

interjection of one whole clause, this second judgment of Lord
Alverstone is really his first judgment."8

Ewart offered his

deductions as proof of a compromise on the question.

Ewart

continued on:
And that which the present writer principally resents
is not Lord Alverstone's treachery, not even his gift
of the two islands to the United States, but his
contemptuous indifference in leaving on record the
arguments which establish our case and affixing to it
a decision against us.
Does he really imagine that
among all the 'colonials' there is no one with wit
enough to detect the imposition, or with courage
enough to denounce it?9
However, Ewart's resentment seems to be misplaced.
Apparently Ewart was unaware of Turner's arguments.

He

failed to acknowledge that the same judgment was possible,
judicial, and logical.

After all, the second judgment was in

favor of Pearse Canal just as the first had been.

They resembled

each other precisely because the judgments resembled each other.
The only difference dealt with the question of where the Pearse
Canal emptied into the ocean, which had not been covered in the
original judgment.

Alverstone had not been aware that there was

a question over that issue when he wrote his first judgment.
However,

in defense of Ewart,

it is easy to jump to his

conclusion without any knowledge of Turner's argumentation.
one reads only the oral arguments and the two verdicts,

If

it would

be natural to assume a diplomatic compromise occurred instead of
a judicial judgment.

But the fact remains, that if Turner's

10 9
arguments are taken into account, as they should be, it is
perfectly logical to judicially decide that the larger Tongass
Passage is the natural path of both the Pearse and Portland
Channels.
Ewart based much of the rest of his essay around
Alverstone's decision in relation to the Portland Channel.

On

the other questions Ewart claims:
if in discussion [of] the second and third [questions]
we find good reason to doubt his good faith, if we
find conclusive evidence that his decision of one or
both of them was dishonest, then we shall not be able
to suppress the belief that all his decisions were of
the same character.10
Apparently Ewart had enough faith in his first judgment to take
this broad leap.
Ewart's arguments became a standard in the historiography
of the Alaskan boundary dispute.
common even in recent writings.

Quotes from his essay are
Ewart's arguments can also be

seen later histories of the Alaskan boundary dispute.

Ewart's

work had a lasting legacy especially among Canadians supporting
greater autonomy.
O. D. Skelton,

like Ewart,

thought Canada should "assume

full sovereignty in isolation from the Empire."11

Skelton served

as Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs from 1925 until
1941.12

He was also a writer and historian.

Skelton's writings were shaped by his "great distrust of
British motives."13

Skelton's major work was his official
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biography of Wilfrid Laurier in 1922, a work that was generally
well received.
Skelton followed Ewart's interpretation of Alverstone's
Portland channel decision,
reconstruction."14

calling it "a classic work of legal

Skelton continued the view that Alverstone had

made a diplomatic decision, which should have been left to
negotiators not a judge.
importance of the area,

However,

Skelton downplayed the real

again focusing on the lack of effective

British control of Canadian foreign relations and Roosevelt's
imprudent actions.
A leading Canadian historian, Adam Shortt,
Skelton's work.

reviewed

He claimed that Skelton's section dealing with

the Alaskan boundary dispute was "not so happy as most other
sections of the work, either in the presentation of facts or in
the spirit in which they are treated."15
The next major writer to tackle the dispute was John W.
Dafoe.

Dafoe had long been the editor of the Winnipeg Free

Press, and a friend of its owner Clifford Sifton.

Dafoe

maintained that he was "the correspondent to whom he

[Sifton]

wrote with the greatest frankness about political matters."16
With his close relation to Sifton, Dafoe wrote a biography of
Clifford Sifton in 1931.
Dafoe's work devoted considerable attention to the Alaskan
Boundary dispute.

Dafoe continued the argument that Alverstone

had made a diplomatic decision, but shifted much of the blame to
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the Americans.

Dafoe maintained Lord Alverstone was bullied into

making a diplomatic decision by the Americans.

He also claimed

the award was "a loss to both sides to the controversy."17
The most extensive look into the Alaskan boundary look came
from Fredrick W. Gibson in 1944.

Gibson wrote the 450 page long

"The Alaskan Boundary Dispute," as his master's thesis.3
Gibson argued that the Canadians had a different definition
of "judicial" than did Lord Alverstone.

To the Canadians

judicial related to the direct interpretation of the law as
embodied in the Treaty of 1825.
"judicial"

Lord Alverstone,

however,

used

in a broader way that required consideration of value

and importance to negotiating parties.18

According to Gibson,

this discrepancy in the meaning of judicial played a major role
in shaping the Canadian view of the award.

The result of the

attack on the non-judicial decision of the award "confirmed
Canadians in the assumption that their country's case possessed
legal merit greater than it actually did."19
However,

just because Alverstone had a different view of

judicial does not mean Gibson agreed with the decision.

Gibson

claimed the award in respect to Portland Channel "was manifestly
a compromise decision and flagrantly violated the judicial
character of the tribunal."

He also attacked Alverstone saying,

As a mediator, if not as a judge, he blundered
seriously in failing to enter into close collaboration

3 While Gibson's thesis was never published, it is extremely important
because later historians such as Norman Penlingtcn and C. P. Stacy
reference it as an "excellent source."
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with his Canadian colleagues and especially in
neglecting to inform them privately of his change of
opinion on the question of Portland Channel.21
While this is a legitimate argument,

it does little to explain

the drastic statement issued by the Canadians.

Surely,

that

statement was further outside the bounds of a judicial settlement
than Alverstone's decision.
The end result for Gibson was "Great Britain advanced one
step nearer an entente cordiale with the United States, at the
cost of temporary estrangement of Canada."22

However, he states

that with the exception of the ratification of the Convention of
1903, "the record of British conduct of the Alaskan negotiations
is one of faithful deference to the wishes of the Canadian
government."23 Gibson fails to effectively explain why if the
British were faithful to Canadian wishes a temporary estrangement
with Canada was necessary.

The fact remains that a large part of

the estrangement is due to the statement of the Canadian
Commissioners.
William Lewis Morton in his 1963 work, The Kingdom of
Canada; a General History from Earliest Times, maintained
"nothing did more to sharpen the Canadian sense of nationality
than the Alaskan boundary dispute and its settlement."24

He

acknowledged Alverstone's decision on the Islands "brought down
on himself and the United Kingdom the wrath of an embittered
Canadian public."23

However,

the author goes on to call Canadian

outrage "an unreasonable reaction."26
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H. George Classen, a Russian immigrant arriving in Canada
via Argentina,

wrote a popular history of the five historic

United State-Canadian border disputes.

His work Thrust and

Counterthrust, offered considerable insight into the award.
Classen claired that Alverstone "had rendered a just judgment on
the land boundary ."'J He also maintained that the United States
had a just case, but would have been better off if it had not
been so abrasive.

The author's main contention was that the

Canadian claim "was absurd."28

He focused much of the blame on

Donald Cameron for moving the line so dramatically.
A review of Classen by Normal Penlington claims Classen's
work suffers from "the frequent American bias of this book."29

He

explains that "Classen has not much to say about the exercise of
American power and its ability to take advantage of Britain's
pre-occupation elsewhere."30

Perhaps most grievous to Penlington

was Classen's lack of attention to established interpretation.
Penlington offered Classen the following as advise-"He will find
that closer attention to the canons and form of historical
scholarship will often give a book more than a temporary
reputation."31

Classen's work may have benefited from

disregarding the cannon.
Norman Penlington, himself offered the next major
interpretation in The Alaskan Boundary Dispute: A Critical
Reappraisal, in 1971.

in his study,

Penlington maintains

Laurier was chiefly responsible for the Alaskan award."

32

The
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reason Laurier is to blame is because he failed to realize the
power structures at work,

Penlington's underlying theme is that

the United States acted like a bully, and Laurier should have
realized he was dealing with a bully.

He said of President

Roosevelt, "the ruthlessness of his actions left a heritage of
Canadian bitterness, which Canadians hid from themselves by
blaming Britain."33

Penlington claims United States policy and

pressure from 1898 is known in the academic world but has "never
been generally accepted by Canadians."34

So Penlington's

reappraisal can be characterized as a shifting of the blame from
Britain to Laurier.

While some blame is better placed on the

Americans, why blame the Americans for taking such a hard stance
when the author admits "the United States had the better claim."35
Another analysis of the dispute was offered by Charles P.
Stacey,

a historian at the University of Toronto.

He argued that

the era of good relations between the Canada and the United
States was a recent development.
Stacey wrote Age of Conflict volume I 1867-1921 in 1984;
and maintained that the award was in the end beneficial,
simple fact it ended the issue.36

for the

However, Stacy also continued

the argument against the diplomatic decision.
"evidence indicates rather strongly...

He claimed,

[that Alverstone]

part of a politician rather than a judge."37

the

acted the

He also felt the

dispute had lasting effect due to Roosevelt's packed court and
unreasonable threats.38

However,

Stacey also attacked the
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Canadian actions.

According to Stacey, Canadian jurists "seem to

have been just as much devoted to their own country's case as the
Americans were to theirs."39

The overall importance of the award

was again connected to the absence of Canada's control over its
own foreign relations.

Stacey compared the Alaskan Award to the

Washington Treaty of 1871, emphasizing Canada's lack of
ratification,

and forced acceptance of both.40

Charles Callan Tansill is the major American historian of
the boundary dispute.
series.

Tansill wrote for the Carnegie Endowment

This series was designed to cover several aspects of the

history of United States-Canadian relations.

The series, while

written by different scholars, generally held that the United
States-Canadian relationship was "born in the civil war and
characterized for almost a century afterwards by tension,
suspicion, and hostility, but gradually issues had been
peacefully resolved,

and arbitrated until unparalleled cordiality

and friendliness prevailed."41
Tansill's 1943 contribution to the series was CanadianAmerican Relations,

1875-1911.

In the introduction Tansill wrote

of the "inspiration of Dr. James Shottwell, who symbolizes as no
one else can, the essential unity of Canadian and American
peoples."42
Tansill compliments the American appointments to the
Tribunal.

He agrees with Henry White's assessment that Lodge

showed "great tact and considerable diplomacy throughout."43

He
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also claims Senator Turner "was far more competent than is
usually supposed."44

Tansill is disappointed by the Root,

feeling

he should have played a greater part in the negotiations.45
for the dispute,
Laurier.

As

Tansill points out the apparent lack of faith of

Tansill's analysis of the Award is limited.

He saw the

chief result of the award as creating a New Imperial Order in the
British Empire.
A. R. M. Lower wrote a review of Tansill's work.
review,

In the

Lower praised Tansill's analysis of the Fisheries

Question,

the Pelagic Sealing question, and the Alaskan boundary

dispute.

Lower further claimed Tansill had written "the

definitive book on these questions.”46

However, he claimed

Tansill had not fully understood the power relationship.

Lower

claimed "power was perhaps the major factor in the Alaskan
Boundary dispute."47

Once again a Canadian historian failed to

examine the historical legacy of the Canadian commissioners.

The

dispute can never be judged on the merits of the case, there must
be some underlying explanation why Canada's claims failed.

The

lasting bitterness is never seen as a result of the
Commissioners'

statement.

Instead the Commissioners'

statement

is seen as proof of foul play.
In the Alaskan boundary dispute, "No party to it acted
irreproachably and perhaps none with great astuteness."48
However,

the historiography of the dispute reflects only the
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American and British infractions.

The trend is to expose

unfortunate incidents and blow them out of proportion.
The most unfortunate incident concerning the Alaskan
boundary dispute is that the bitterness lasted so long.

In

reality "Canada lost nothing of great value and the United States
gained nothing of great value."49

When the award came in 1903,

"Dyea was already dead and Skagway dying."33

In actuality,

what

the award gave the United States was land "barring the way to
decaying mines in an undeveloped wilderness."51
This wilderness on the edge of the world was not vast.
Canada lost its claim to territory "probably half as large as
Scotland" while the United States lost an area roughly the size
of Rhode Island.52
As for any legal precedent, the Alaska boundary dispute did
little to establish any constructive precedent in boundary
settlements.

The greatest benefit in this regard, "is that an

experiment was made on material which did not matter very much
and that useful experience was gained by trial and error."53
The boundary dispute had little actual effect on later
events.

While its "lingering bitterness... paved the way for an

explosion of Canadian nationalism in 1911."54

The most direct

effect was that it was "responsible for much ill feeling in
Canada,

and for the failure in all probability of the Reciprocity

Treaty eight years later."55
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The British author Harry Cranbrook Allen tried to promote
the main theme "Canada had no alternative but to accept the
ironical axiom of her political existence, that though she might
pay the highest price for Anglo-American friendship,
its greatest beneficiary."56

she was also

It seems that close to one-hundred

years later, Canadians are still more concerned with relative
power and possible infractions than accepting any possible
benefits that could have been received from the Hay-Herbert
Trea* • 'T the Award.
The Hay-Herbert treaty established an agreeable settlement,
but

nada's major benefit of forcing the United States to

a r b i t . :e and finding a face-saving way out of its extravagant
claims was destroyed by Theodore Roosevelt's appointments and
threats.

These actions led to the Canadian refusal to sign the

award, which promoted the view of Great Britain selling out
Canadian interests to the United States.

The result of this view

allowed Canadians to convert the Alaskan boundary dispute into a
political fight with Great Britain.
The Alaskan boundary dispute's connection with the right to
self-control of foreign relations and possible independence,
became a focal point in Canadian history.

Canadians became the

prime historical writers on the Alaskan boundary award, because
of the greater impact the award had on Canadian history.

Instead

of creating a critical interpretation of the Hay-Herbert treaty,
which can only be achieved by looking at both the treaty benefits
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at the time of negotiation and then the results of the treaty,
the Canadian research focused on Lord Alverstone's perceived
betrayal of Canadian interests and Theodore Roosevelt's actions.
Meanwhile the relative historical insignificance of the Alaska
boundary dispute upon American and British history provided
little counter-interpretation.

Therefore, the lasting legacy of

the Alaskan boundary dispute was Canadian bitterness towards
Great Britain and the United States.
It should be said that the Hay-Herbert treaty provided
Canada a chance to erase years of anti-Americanism and ill will
towards Great Britain by allowing Canada to force America to
answer Canadian claims.

Roosevelt's actions were disruptive to

the award, which in the eyes of Canadians allowed the United
States to avoid accountability.
widespread outrage,

which attributed to the misinterpretation of

the Alaskan boundary dispute.
Herbert treaty,

Canada reacted to the award with

The overshadowing of the Hay-

in favor of the overemphasis of the award,

resulted in the use of the Alaskan boundary dispute as Canadian
evidence for justifying their fear of American jingoism and
supporting their belief in British disloyalty.

In truth however,

the Hay-Herbert treaty was evidence of American accountability
and British loyalty.
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